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WORKING WITH CANCER: HOW THE LAW CAN HELP
SURVIVORS MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT
Ann C. Hodges*
Abstract: Advances in cancer treatment are saving lives, but along with the benefits come
challenges. Millions of cancer survivors of working age need to support themselves and their
families. This Article looks at the impact of cancer on employment starting with the
empirical evidence gathered by researchers affiliated with medical centers. This empirical
research provides a base, not previously explored in the legal literature, for assessing the
existing laws dealing with cancer and employment (or unemployment). Viewing the law
through this lens, which reveals the complex relationship between cancer and employment,
exposes both the promise and the weakness of existing laws and offers ideas about legal
changes that would better meet the needs of cancer survivors and their families.
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INTRODUCTION
Faced with a cancer diagnosis, chemistry teacher Walter White,
protagonist of the popular television show Breaking Bad, turned to the
drug trade to provide financial security for his family.' Dramatic
potential notwithstanding, most cancer patients do not "break bad."
Instead they are more like Sarah.' After working ten months for her
current employer, Sarah was diagnosed with lung cancer, which requires
regular chemotherapy treatments and surgery. Her employer, a hospital,
has several hundred employees, many of whom are engaged in shift
work. To accommodate her treatment, Sarah has been trading shifts with
other employees to avoid working on treatment days, but her supervisor
has objected and threatened to fire her for being unable to work her
regularly scheduled shift. In addition, the supervisor has begun to
1. About
the Show: Breaking Bad,
bad/exclusives/about (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).

AMC,

http://www.amc.com/shows/breaking-

2. Sarah is not a real person but a composite of cases handled by a nonprofit organization that
assists individuals with cancer and their families with legal issues arising from their cancer. See
infra note 4 and accompanying text.
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criticize her job performance, despite her stellar review after six months
of employment. The stress from fear of job loss has compounded the
stress from the cancer diagnosis. Like most employees, Sarah's health
insurance is through her employer. She is facing surgery and has only
accumulated two weeks of paid sick leave, a generous amount
considering her short tenure, which she has been saving for the surgery
and recovery. She is ineligible for more, either by law or employment
policy, because of her length of employment. Although the doctors have
offered her hope that treatment will provide a good chance of survival,
she is uncertain whether she will be able to return to full-time work
within two weeks of the surgery. Sarah needs to support herself and her
family now and in the future, and needs continued health insurance to
pay for treatment. Sarah's situation is typical of many cancer patients.
Cancer is no longer a death sentence. As a result of significant
advances in cancer treatment, individuals with cancer are living longer.
In many cases, cancer is now a chronic disease rather than a fatal one.
These advances in medicine, however positive, come with costs for the
survivors and society. The treatments that preserve lives are often
expensive. In addition to paying for treatment, individuals with cancer
must continue to support themselves and their families during and after
treatment. Indeed, as former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor discovered
during her own cancer treatment, maintaining employment can assist in
battling cancer: "As tired and stressed out as I was, I had a job that was
hard and important and was always there for me to do." 3
Despite the need to maintain employment and the benefits of doing
so, many individuals with cancer or a history of cancer are either
unemployed or underemployed. Because health insurance is tied to
employment for many in the United States, the lack of employment may
lead to inability to pay for treatment and necessary follow-up. Not
surprisingly, unemployment leads to credit problems and bankruptcy.
Accordingly, the changing face of cancer imposes both individual and
societal costs.
Not all cancers fit this picture, however. Cancer ranges from the basal
cell carcinoma that is treated in one or two doctor visits to advanced
liver cancer that is rapidly fatal. Moreover, even within cancer types,
researchers are discovering that cancer is not one, but many different
diseases. The treatment and effects vary widely. What unites most
3. Jess Bravin et al., For Some Justices, the Bush-Gore Case Has a PersonalAngle--Scalia and
Thomas Were Campaign Flashpoints;Two Owe Jobs to Clinton-A Son at Bush's Law Firm, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000, at Al, A14.1. Thanks to Louis P. Pfeffer for bringing this quote to my
attention.
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cancers, however, is the long-term and life-changing consequences of
the disease. Survivors live with continual follow-up, lasting effects of
treatment, and the possibility and reality of recurrence and further
treatment.
As the medical profession has advanced in cancer treatment, the law
has fallen behind in addressing the needs of cancer survivors. When
cancer patients almost inevitably died, and rather quickly, the major
intersection of law and cancer was in providing for the patient's
survivors after death. As survival becomes the norm, issues of health
insurance coverage, employment, and disability benefits for the cancer
survivor come to the fore. While the law addresses each of these issues
in various ways, none are precisely tailored to the evolving needs of
cancer survivors.
Because cancer affects millions of Americans, this Article seeks to
begin a dialogue about the best way for the law to address the needs of
survivors and their families. The focus on cancer derives from extensive
personal experience with the legal needs of cancer patients.4 Focusing on
cancer is also appropriate because of the sheer number of individuals
affected, the substantial anticipated growth in the number of survivors in
the future, and the staggering cost of lost productivity resulting from
cancer. 5 But in many ways the issues discussed in this Article are not
unique to cancer, as survival rates have increased for other chronic
diseases such as HIV, 6 diabetes, and heart disease, raising similar public
policy issues at the intersection of law and medicine. 7 Thus, this
examination of cancer and law may provide lessons for other illnesses as
well.
4. The author co-founded LINC, an organization designed to meet the legal needs of cancer
patients. The Founders: Who Started LINC?, CANCERLINC, http://www.cancerlinc.org/
?page id=2025 (last visited May 21, 2015).
5. See infra notes 11-33.
6. Although the number of individuals with HIV is much smaller than those with cancer,
individuals with HIV have seen similar increases in survival rates and face some similar issues in
employment. See Brent Braveman et al., HIV/AIDS and Return to Work: A LiteratureReview OneDecade Post-Introductionof Combination Therapy (HAART), 27 WoRK 295, 295, 299-301 (2006)
(noting the approximately 850,000-950,000 individuals living with HIV in the United States and
various barriers limiting their return to work); Caroline Palmer & Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to
Cross: Evolving and Emerging Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 477-79 (2001) (identifying discrimination and the need for
accommodation as issues for individuals with HIV and noting the importance of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Rehabilitation Act, and similar state laws in dealing
with those problems).
7. See Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 453,455 (2009) (identifying the need to address chronic illness
in proposals for health care reform).
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This Article begins with a discussion of the scope of the issue,
examining the prevalence of cancer, the increases in survival rates, and
the impact of cancer on employment, as well as the effects of
unemployment and underemployment of cancer survivors. 8 Having
explored the problem, this Article then moves to the normative goals that
the law should seek to achieve for cancer patients. Finally, this Article
focuses on two laws that are designed to preserve and promote
employment of individuals with health conditions such as cancer: the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 9 and the Family Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA"). 10 As the Article considers the effects of these
laws, it will apply them to Sarah, the hypothetical but typical cancer
patient, as an example of their impact.
After analyzing these laws, this Article concludes that while recent
amendments to the ADA benefit cancer survivors, neither the ADA nor
the FMLA as currently constituted is sufficient to provide the protection
needed by individuals with cancer to enable them to maintain and obtain
employment. Recommendations for legal changes that might provide
better support follow. This is only the first step in an analysis of the
variety of laws that impact the ability of survivors to support themselves
and their families and maintain the health insurance coverage required to
obtain the continuing treatment they need.
I.

THE NEW FACE OF CANCER

In the United States alone, there are nearly 14.5 million cancer
survivors.11 Almost 1.7 million people will be diagnosed with cancer in
2015.12 Estimates are that the number of cancer survivors will double
between 2010 and 2020.13 These increasing numbers result from
8. Definitions of "cancer survivor" and determinations of when a cancer patient becomes a
survivor vary. See INST. OF MED., FROM CANCER PATIENT TO CANCER SURVIVOR: LOST IN

TRANSITION 23-30 (Maria Hewitt et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. For simplicity, this
Article will use the National Cancer Institute's Office of Cancer Survivorship definition, adopted
from the National Coalition of Cancer Survivors: "An individual is considered a cancer survivor
from the time of diagnosis, through the balance of his or her life." Id. at 29.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
11. AM. CANCER SOC., CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter FACTS AND
FIGURES], available at http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@editorial/documents/documen/
acspc-044552.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Michael P. Markowski, Three Essays on Cancer Survivorship and Labor Supply 6 (Dec.
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with author). Other

estimates vary, with one suggesting a more than thirty percent increase to eighteen million
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improvements in the relative survival rate1 4 of many cancers. For all
cancers diagnosed between 2004 and 2010, the five-year survival rate
was about two-thirds." 5As recently as 1960, only one quarter of those
diagnosed survived for five years, 16 and by 1975-77, it remained less
than half.' 7 For some cancers the increase in survival rates is dramatic,
18
while for a few the rate is relatively flat or even slightly decreasing.
Overall, however, the number of cancer survivors is growing rapidly
because the most common cancers-breast, colorectal and prostate'9have increased survival rates.2 ° Indeed, these cancers account for half of
all survivors.21 These improved survival rates result from both earlier
diagnosis and more effective treatments. Not only is the survival rate
increasing, but the number of individuals diagnosed with cancer is also
increasing. In the United States alone, new cancer cases exceed one
million per year, and are expected to increase to more than two million
per year by 2050.23
As the number of individuals diagnosed and the survival rate increase,
there are more cancer survivors of working age. Current estimates are
that about forty percent of cancer survivors are between the ages of

American survivors. Donatus U. Ekwueme et al., Medical Costs and ProductivityLosses of Cancer
Survivors-UnitedStates, 2008-2011, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 505, 505 (2013)
(reporting on Centers for Disease Control research). Regardless of the exact number it is clearly
significant, affecting millions of Americans.
14. This rate compares the survival of individuals with cancer to others of similar age, race, and
sex without a cancer diagnosis. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 51.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Guy Maytal & John Peteet, The Meaning of Work, in WORK AND CANCER SURVIVORS 105,
105 (Michael Feuerstein ed., 2009).
17. FACTS AND FIGURES, supranote 11, at 18.
18. For example, the survival rate of prostate cancer increased from sixty-eight percent in 197577 to greater than ninety-nine percent in 2004-10 and for non-Hodgkins lymphoma from fortyseven percent to seventy-one percent for the same time period. Id. For pancreatic cancer, the
survival rate increased from three percent to seven percent, statistically significant but still very low.
Id. For uterine corpus cancer the rate actually declined from eighty-seven percent to eighty-three
percent. Id.
19. IOM REPORT, supranote 8, at 49, 54, 57.
20. The increases in survival rates between 1975-77 and 2004-10 for these cancers are as
follows: (1) Breast: seventy-five to ninety-one percent; (2) Colon: fifty-one to sixty-five percent; (3)
Rectum: forty-eight to sixty-eight percent; and (4) Prostate: sixty-eight to over ninety-nine percent.
FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 18.

21.
22.
23.
at 25.

IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 45.
FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 2.
Richard J. Butler et al., Economic Burden, in WORK AND CANCER SURVIVORS, supra note 16,
This estimate is based on both the increase in population and the aging of the population. Id.
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twenty and sixty-four.24 As diagnosis and treatment continue to improve,
the number of cancer survivors of prime working age will grow as well.
This Article focuses on this growing population of survivors.
II.

CANCER AND WORK

A.

The Relationship of Cancer and Work

The changing nature of cancer has focused the interest of health care
providers and policy makers on survivorship. 25 As aptly stated in the
Institute of Medicine's major report on survivorship, survivorship is "a
medical and social condition with major economic implications."26 A
recent study of cancer survivors by the Centers for Disease Control
found the average productivity losses and medical costs per person were
significantly higher for cancer survivors than for individuals without a
history of cancer.27 A major component of the survivorship focus is
work, for reasons impacting both individual survivors and the economy.
The National Institutes of Health estimates the national cost of cancer at
$263.8 billion, with more than half of that due to lost productivity
resulting from both the effects of the illness and premature death.28
Billions of work days are lost or affected by cancer. 29 Additionally,
employees may be deterred from job changes because of fears about the
impact on health insurance, creating an economically inefficient result
that prevents the best use of employee talents. 30 Loss of income due to
illness is a major contributor to bankruptcy in the United States. 31 A
24. Markowski, supranote 13, at 7; see also IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 32 (indicating that in
2002 thirty-eight percent of cancer survivors were between the ages of twenty and sixty-four).
25. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-30 (describing the development of advocacy groups and
establishment of the Office of Cancer Survivorship in the National Cancer Institute to focus
research on survivorship as a result of the increase in survivors).
26. Id. at 20.
27. Ekwueme et al., supra note 13, at 506.
28. Markowski, supra note 13, at 7. A study by Butler, Johnson, and Gubler reached similar
results, finding that productivity losses from cancer, about $145 billion per year, were twice the
direct cost of cancer treatment, about $74 billion per year. Butler et al., supra note 23, at 25, 69.
29. Markowski, supra note 13, at 7.
30. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES: BRINGING
WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO Focus 60 (2009) (describing the deterrent effect of

fear of loss of health insurance coverage in general as a "market failure that decreases the efficiency
of the U.S. economy").
31. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741 (2009), available at http://www.amjmed.com/article/
S0002-9343%2809%2900404-5/fulltext?refuid=S002-9343%289%2900525-7&refissn=00O29343 (finding that sixty-two percent of bankruptcies in 2007 were caused by medical reasons,
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cancer diagnosis significantly increases the likelihood of bankruptcy.3 2
Additionally, the likelihood of home foreclosure increases significantly
in the five years following a cancer diagnosis. 33 These bankruptcies and
foreclosures impose both individual and societal costs.
While these productivity and financial losses are important to society,
from an individual and family perspective, cancer and employment have
a complex relationship. For some, work may be a source of normality
and distraction from the disease, providing a psycho-social benefit to the
patient.34 For others, work may be a necessity to maintain financial
resources and the health insurance that provides access to essential
treatment.35 But the security provided by continuing work may be
unavailable to those whose cancer and its effects make working difficult
or impossible.3 6 Among the effects of cancer and cancer treatment that
may limit the ability to work are: the immune suppression effects of
certain therapies that require avoiding close contact with people who
might carry infectious bacteria; physical limitations, such as difficulty
speaking, lifting, walking, or standing; cognitive or other mental
limitations due to either brain cancers, metastases, or chemotherapy
effects; depression; and fatigue.37
including significant medical costs, loss of income, and/or mortgaging a home to pay medical bills).
The study found that most of the debtors were middle class, well-educated and homeowners and
most had health insurance at the beginning of their illness. Id. More than a third of the families
impacted suffered job loss, either the patient or a caregiver. Id.
32. Scott Ramsey et al., Washington State Cancer Patients Found to Be at Greater Risk of
Bankruptcy Than People Without a Cancer Diagnosis, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1143, 1143 (2013)
(finding that cancer patients were 2.65 times more likely to file for bankruptcy than those without
cancer and younger patients were more likely to file than older patients, perhaps because the latter
had access to Social Security and Medicare benefits).
33. Arpit Gupta et al., Cancer Diagnoses and Household Debt Overhang 4 (Columbia Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 514, 2015), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2583975 (finding a
sixty-five percent increase in the likelihood of foreclosure in the five years post-diagnosis). Those
with more advanced cancers had an even greater risk of foreclosure. Id. The authors found that
those with substantial equity in their homes did not have an increase in foreclosure rates, however.
Id.
34. See V.S. Blinder et al., Employment After a Breast CancerDiagnosis: A Qualitative Study of
Ethnically Diverse Urban Women, 37 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 763, 763 (2011); Maytal & Peteet,
supra note 16, at 113; Corine Tiedtke et al., Experiences and Concerns About 'Returning to Work'
for Women Breast Cancer Survivors: A Literature Review, 19 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 677, 680 (2010)
(meta-analysis of six studies from three countries); supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting
Justice O'Connor's statement regarding how her ability to continue her important work on the Court
helped her cope with cancer).
35. Maytal & Peteet, supranote 16, at 113; Tiedtke et al., supranote 34, at 680.
36. See Pamela Farley Short et al., Employment Pathways in a Large Cohort of Adult Cancer
Survivors, 103 CANCER 1292, 1292 (2005) (showing long-term effects of cancer on ability to work).
37. Ekuweme et al., supranote 13, at 507; Maytal & Peteet, supra note 16, at 115.
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Many of these effects last long after treatment is completed. 38 And
today some drug therapies for cancer continue for extended periods of
time, prolonging the effects of treatment. 39 For some patients, continuing
work during treatment may make recovery more difficult by interfering
with treatment protocols, while for others returning to work too quickly
may exacerbate the effects of treatment, such as fatigue, impairing long
term recovery.4 ° On the other hand, some patients may alter their
preferences for time allocation as a result of cancer, preferring more
leisure time to work where economically feasible, or changing to a more
desirable job.4 '
Patients who continue to work during treatment may gain more than
income and insurance. Their commitment may solidify their
employment relationship, making retention and promotion more likely in
the future.42 Ceasing to work, even temporarily, may alter an employee's
career trajectory, making it more difficult to get desirable future
employment.43 Working patients also may enjoy the social support of
fellow employees. 44
This complex set of factors results in several possible employment
outcomes for cancer patients and survivors. The individual may continue
to work throughout treatment, recovery, and post-treatment survival.
Alternatively, the individual may voluntarily cease employment at any
point during this trajectory of survivorship, either as a result of problems
in maintaining employment due to the cancer or in order to spend time
on alternative pursuits deemed of higher value. The third alternative is
that the employee is involuntarily terminated as a result of the cancer,
for some unrelated reason, or a combination of the two. Finally, because
cancer incidence increases with age, some employees may choose to
retire, either because it has become a more attractive choice as a result of
the illness or because of the difficulty of working combined with
eligibility for retirement benefits to provide income.
As is evident from the prior description of alternatives, the
38. Kathleen Oberst et al., Work Task Disability in Employed Breast and Prostate Cancer
Patients, 4 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 322, 323 (2010).
39. IOM REPORT, supranote 8, at 17.
40. Joanna Pryce et al., Cancer Survivorship and Work: Symptoms, Supervisor Response, CoWorker Disclosureand Work Adjustment, 17 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 83, 90-91 (2006);
Tiedtke et al., supra note 34, at 680-81.
41. IOM REPORT, supranote 8, at 364; Tiedtke et al., supranote 34, at 681.
42. Markowski, supranote 13, at 24.
43. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Breast Cancer Survival Work and Earnings,21 J. HEALTH ECON. 757,
777 (2002) [hereinafter Breast CancerSurvival].
44. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 364.
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employment status of the patient/survivor may vary over time as the
cancer status changes. Other than binary employment outcomes, cancer
may reduce voluntary job changes by employees because of concerns
about insurance or discrimination or cause on the job employment
problems such as harassment or discrimination. 45 Additionally,
employees may reduce or increase work hours or change jobs because of
cancer and its effects.46
The relationship of cancer and work may change based on the
employee's stage of survivorship. Like cancer, which is staged based on
the individual's medical condition,4 7 survivorship has stages or
",seasons."48 "Acute survival" starts with diagnosis and continues with
treatment. 49 This stage is characterized by fear and anxiety.50 The second
season, "extended survival," is the period of remission or the end of the
initial, intensive course of treatment. 5' During this phase, the individual
is monitored closely and may have some additional treatment, depending
on the cancer and its medical stage at diagnosis. The survivor is
dealing with fear of recurrence and any residual physical effects of
treatment such as fatigue, loss of strength, and perhaps loss of some part
of the body. 53 At the same time, the survivor is integrating back into
daily life. 4 The final season is "permanent survival," which is
considered a cure, but the mental and physical effects of cancer often
remain with the survivor during this stage.5 5 Any recurrence of cancer

45. Id. at 369-70.
46. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Breast Cancerand Women's Labor Supply, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES.
1309, 1320-23 (2002) [hereinafter Breast Cancer and Women's Labor] (finding that women
working after a breast cancer diagnosis work more hours per week than those without breast
cancer); Anja Mehnert, Employment and Work-Related Issues in Cancer Survivors, 77 CRITICAL
REV. ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 106, 124 (2011) (finding most studies in meta-analysis that
analyzed work hours showed reduction in hours by cancer survivors with some studies showing
significant job changes as well). Possible explanations for the increase in hours may be an effort to
recover savings depleted by treatment or a renewed commitment to work as a result of the cancer.
Id. at 1325.
47. For a description of cancer staging, see FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 2-3, 17.
48. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 28. These "seasons" were first described by Fitzhugh Mullan,
a founder of the National Coalition of Cancer Survivors in an article in the New England Journal of
Medicine. Id. at 27-28.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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will begin the seasons anew. Employment may be affected by the
physical or mental and emotional impacts of the particular stage of
survivorship. One who ceased working voluntarily or involuntarily may
choose to return to employment at a later stage of survival. This
relationship is reflected in the research on the determinants of
employment, which is addressed in the next section.
B.

Determinantsof Employment

Medical researchers have investigated the determinants of
employment for cancer patients and survivors to assess how employment
affects, and is affected by, diagnosis and treatment. The goal of this
research is to determine how to ensure the best medical outcome for
cancer patients. The research also enables an assessment of the current
legal protections and benefits for cancer survivors and a determination of
whether they are sufficient to ensure that these survivors can support
themselves and their families after diagnosis and obtain the necessary
medical treatment for their condition. A review of the existing research
follows.
Cancer affects employment adversely in every stage of survival.
Cancer survivors are less likely to be working than similar individuals
without cancer. 6 Such a relationship is not unexpected, given the serious
health implications of cancer and cancer treatment.57 Cancer causes
56. A meta-analysis of a number of studies of cancer and employment found that "cancer
survivors were 1.37 times more likely to be unemployed than healthy control participants." Angela
G.E.M. de Boer et al., CancerSurvivors and Unemployment, a Meta-Analysis and Meta-Regression,
301 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 753, 760 (2009); see also Breast Cancer and Women's Labor, supra note
46, at 1324-25 (finding that women with breast cancer are less likely to work than women without
breast cancer even when controlling for health status); Cathy J. Bradley et al. Short-Term Effects of
Breast Cancer on Labor Market Attachment: Results from a Longitudinal Study, 24 J. HEALTH
ECON. 137, §§ 2, 5.2, 5.3 (2005) [hereinafter Short-Term Effects] (finding that women with breast
cancer were less likely to work in the six months following diagnosis than a control group. Also,
those who continued to work, worked fewer hours than the control group. This Article cites other
studies showing declines in work); Butler et al., supranote 23, at 59, 67 (finding "cancer survivors
on average never fully recover to their pre-cancer levels of employment" and specifically that the
employment rate of colon cancer survivors is twenty percent lower than for others of similar age);
Mehnert, supra note 46, at 122 (conducting a meta-analysis of sixty-four studies and finding that
cancer survivors had lower rates of employment, although their employment increased over time
after diagnosis. On average 63.5% returned to work).
57. The meta-analysis found based on some of the studies that the disability risk was higher for
cancer survivors, which might well explain the difference in employment rates. de Boer, supra note
56, at 761. Further, unemployment rates are higher with certain cancer diagnoses, which correlates
with the physical effects of the cancer and treatment. Id.; see also Short et al., supra note 36, at
1292-93 (showing twenty percent of 1433 cancer survivors followed over time had cancer-related
disabilities at follow-up, with half of those working despite the disability); Oberst et al., supra note
38, at 326 (finding cancer-related disability rates in breast and prostate cancer survivors declining
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greater work impairment than other serious medical issues. 58 Research
has also demonstrated, however, that many survivors return to work over
time. 59 The most drastic effects on employment occur in the first year
after diagnosis, typically the acute survival stage. 60 Nevertheless, many
cancer survivors have some residual disability that affects their ability to
work. 61 A study of survivors with a wide variety of cancers showed that
functional limitations affected survivors' ability to work.62 Among the
tasks that created some difficulty were heavy lifting, keeping up a pace

over time but still present for some patients eighteen months after diagnosis and negatively related
to employment); Pamela Farley Short et al., Work Disability Associated with Cancer Survivorship
and Other Chronic Conditions, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 91 (2008) (finding cancer survivors had
disability rates higher than the general population, but about the same as those with other chronic
conditions).
58. IOM REPORT, supranote 8, at 370-71.
59. See Cathy J. Bradley & Heather L. Bednarek, Employment Patterns of Long-Term Cancer
Survivors, 11 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 188, 193 (2002) (finding that of sixty-seven percent of patients
working at their cancer diagnosis were working five-to-seven years later); Mehnert, supra note 46,
at 122 (conducting a meta-analysis of sixty-four studies which showed steady increase in return to
work by survivors over time); Evelien R. Spelten et al., FactorsReported to Influence the Return to
Work of CancerSurvivors: A LiteratureReview, 11 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 124, 127-28 (2001).
60. See Cathy J. Bradley, Absenteeism from Work: The Experience of Employed Breast and
Prostate CancerPatients in the Months Following Diagnosis, 15 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 739, 739-40
(2006) [hereinafter Absenteeism] (finding thirty percent of breast and prostate cancer patients who
were working prior to diagnosis were not working six months after diagnosis and those who
continued to work worked fewer hours); Cathy J. Bradley et al., Employment and Cancer. Findings
from a LongitudinalStudy of Breast and ProstateCancer Survivors, 25 CANCER INVESTIGATION 47,
49- 51 (2007) [hereinafter Employment and Cancer] (finding breast and prostate cancer survivors
were less likely to be employed six months after diagnosis, but at twelve and eighteen months after
diagnosis, many had returned to work and employment was not lower than in a control group);
Short et al., supra note 36, at 1296 (finding in study of 1433 cancer survivors that forty-one percent
of males and thirty-nine percent of females stopped working during treatment but most would return
to work within a year of diagnosis); Comd A. Roelen et al., Sickness Absence and Full Return to
Work After Cancer: 2-Year Follow-up of Register Datafor Different Cancer Sites, 20 PSYCHOONCOLOGY 1001, 1001 (2011) (finding seventy-three percent of cancer survivors working before
diagnosis fully returned to work after a median duration of 290 days and within two years of
diagnosis, most had returned to work).
61. Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 193 (finding that twenty-four percent of survivors of
lung, colorectal, breast, and prostate cancer who were working at the time of their cancer diagnosis
but were not working five-to-seven years later stopped working because of poor health or
disability); de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 761; Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 51-52
(reporting that breast and prostate cancer survivors indicated that cancer interfered with various
physical and cognitive tasks required by their jobs twelve months after diagnosis); Short et al.,
supra note 36, at 1296 (finding twenty percent of survivors in cohort of 1433 reported some residual
disability and eleven percent of survivors who returned to work after treatment left work for cancerrelated reasons in the next three years while nine percent of survivors who worked through
treatment left work for cancer-related reasons within four years of diagnosis).
62. Michal C. Moskowitz et al., Function and Frictionat Work: A Multidimensional Analysis of
Work Outcomes in CancerSurvivors, 8 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 173, 177 (2014).
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of work, concentration, learning new tasks, and analyzing data. 63 A
residual disability may cause job changes or reductions in hours and may
require some accommodation by the employer.
Researchers have analyzed the effects of cancer on employment to
determine what factors impact whether survivors maintain employment
during and after treatment, and whether survivors reduce or increase
hours worked. Some studies have focused on particular cancerscommonly breast and prostate-which have high survival rates, 64 while
others have studied all cancer survivors. Studies are often limited to the
populations in particular geographic areas surrounding major cancer
treatment centers, although a few have aggregated multiple studies. A
number of factors appear to affect employment. Among them are the
following: (1) type and stage of cancer; (2) physical and mental health
during and following treatment, including both the impact of the cancer
and the effects of treatment; (3) demographic factors such as race,
ethnicity, gender, and age; (4) type ofjob; (5) source of health insurance;
and (6) employer support and accommodation. The following sections
analyze the impact of these factors as revealed by various studies.
1.

Cancer and Treatment Factors

Not surprisingly, the type and stage of cancer has been shown to
affect employment in many studies.65 Some cancers are more
debilitating than others. Later stage cancers are more debilitating than
cancers diagnosed at earlier stages. Lung cancer and most head and neck
cancers are negatively associated with work, while testicular cancer,
melanoma, and thyroid cancer appear to cause few work limitations.66
Brain, bone, liver, pancreatic, rectal, and blood cancers also significantly
reduce employment67 as do breast cancer, gastrointestinal cancers, and
female reproductive cancers.68 Studies of prostate cancer and
63. Bradley & Bednarek, supranote 59, at 196.
64. Breast cancer survivors comprise both the largest percentage of all survivors and the largest
percentage of female survivors. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Does Employer-ProvidedHealth Insurance
Constrain Labor Supply Adjustments to Health Shocks? New Evidence on Women Diagnosed with
Breast Cancer, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 833, 835 (2013) [hereinafter Employer-Provided Health
Insurance].
65. Mehnert, supranote 46, at 123 (meta-analysis of sixty-four studies showing type and stage of
cancer affected probability of working).
66. Butler et al., supra note 23, at 58; de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 757-58; Roelen et al.,
supra note 60, at 1003-04; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 124, 126, 128.
67. Butler et al., supra note 23, at 58; de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 757-58.
68. de Boer et al., supranote 56, at 757-58; Employer-ProvidedHealth Insurance, supranote 64,
at 835; Spelten et al., supra note 57, at 126; Short-Term Effects, supra note 56, § 5.2.
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employment show mixed results. 69 Later stage cancers adversely affect

work in most studies 70 but not for all cancers; a study of Hodgkins and
lymphoma patients showed no relationship between cancer stage and

work.7 1 Survivors with a recurrence, metastasis, or second primary
cancers have lower employment rates and work hours compared to the

general population than survivors who are cancer free, although both
groups suffer reduced employment for as long as two to six years after
diagnosis.72
The physical and mental effects of cancer and treatment also impact
work, again a result that is not surprising. 73 Cancer-related disabilities

cause employees to leave the workplace.74 In a study of breast and
prostate cancer patients, the type of treatment had the greatest impact on

absenteeism from work for those who continued to work. 75 Fifty-two

percent of those receiving chemotherapy stopped working.76 Physical

and psychological symptoms caused reduced hours or changes in their
occupational role for survivors in another study.77 Some cancer
69. See Butler et al., supra note 23, at 52, 58 (finding higher unemployment for prostate cancer
survivors); de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 758 (finding no higher risk of unemployment for
prostate cancer survivors); Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 50-51 (finding reduced
employment for prostate cancers six months after diagnosis but no statistically significant reduced
employment twelve and eighteen months after diagnosis).
70. Reynard R. Bouknight et al., Correlatesof Return to Work for Breast CancerSurvivors, 24 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 345, 348-49 (2006) (finding women with advanced stage breast tumors had a
reduced likelihood of returning to work); Short et al., supra note 36, at 1298; Spelten et al., supra
note 59, at 128.
71. Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128. But see Short et al., supra note 36, at 1297, 1298
(showing that Stage IV blood and lymph cancers adversely affected employment).
72. John R. Moran et al., Long-Term Employment Effects of Surviving Cancer, 30 J. HEALTH
ECON. 505, 509-10 (2011).
73. See Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123-24 (showing impact of treatment on working).
74. Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 193; de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 761 (metaanalysis showing reasons for unemployment were "physical limitations, cancer-related symptoms,
or both"); Oberst et al., supra note 38, at 326. In using the term disability here I use it as used in the
studies, not as a legal definition of disability under any particular statute or disability plan.
75. Absenteeism, supra note 60, at 743-44; see also Mahasin S. Mujahid et al., Racial/Ethnic
Differences in Job Loss for Women with Breast Cancer, 5 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 102, 109
(2009) (finding more aggressive treatment associated with higher levels of absenteeism).
76. Absenteeism, supra note 60, at 742. In another study, Hassett found that chemotherapy
adversely affected employment of women with breast cancer. Michael J. Hassett et al., Factors
Influencing Changes in Employment Among Women with Newly Diagnosed Breast Cancer, 115
CANCER 2775, 2778 (2009) (finding women receiving chemotherapy had "1.8-fold greater risk of
experiencing a change in employment versus women who were not receiving chemotherapy").
When age was considered, there was a statistically significant association for women over age fiftyone, but not those age fifty-one and under. ld
77. John F. Steiner, The Impact of Physical and PsychosocialFactors on Work Characteristics
After Cancer, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 138, 140-41 (2008).
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survivors, however, with an average of seven years post-diagnosis,
worked more hours and had higher pay than a control group.78
2.

DemographicFactors

Several studies have found that race and ethnicity are associated with
employment and cancer. 79 African-American women were less likely to
remain employed following breast cancer diagnosis. 80 Similarly, lowincome Latinas were less likely to be employed at six and eighteen

months after a breast cancer diagnosis than low-income, non-Latina

whites.8" Type of work, with more physical jobs associated with lower
levels of employment, was a factor in the disparity, but did not fully
explain the difference. 2 The authors posited that lack of knowledge of

lymphedema, a frequent complication of breast cancer surgery and its

treatment, might be an additional causative factor.8 3 And another study
found that independent of socio-demographic factors, Latina women
were more likely to suffer unemployment as a result of breast cancer
than white women, but found no similar difference between AfricanAmerican and white women. 4 Researchers theorized that the differences
might result from problems "navigating the health care system and in
turn balancing work and treatment ' 85 and/or language barriers or other

78. Breast Cancer and Women's Labor, supra note 46, at 1325; Breast Cancer Survival, supra
note 43, at 769. The women in the study tended to be white, married, and well-educated, which may
have affected the results. Women in that demographic are more likely to have jobs without physical
demands that might limit the ability to work. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. The
women also may have been working more to replace lost income. Infra notes 93-99 and
accompanying text.
79. See Steiner, supra note 77, at 145; infra notes 80-86 (citing relevant Articles).
80. Bouknight et al., supra note 70, at 348, 351; Cathy J. Bradley & Amber Wilk, Racial
Differences in Quality of Life and Employment Outcomes in Insured Women with Breast Cancer,8
J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 49, 51, 58 (2014) (finding substantial reduced employment among
African-American women after a diagnosis of cancer as compared to non-Hispanic white women
after controlling for many job characteristics and insurance, leading to supposition that differences
in treatment regimen or symptom control might explain the difference); Employment and Cancer,
supra note 60, at 49; Hassett et al., supra note 76, at 2775. Another study found no statistically
significant difference between white and African-American women in job loss following cancer
after controlling for other socio-demographic factors, however. Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at
106.
81. Victoria S.Blinder et al., Return to Work in Low-Income Latina and Non-Latina White Breast
CancerSurvivors: A 3- Year LongitudinalStudy, 118 CANCER 1664, 1664, 1667 (2012).
82. Id. at 1672.
83. Id at 1669. Lymphedema is a complication that causes lymph fluid to pool in the arm,
resulting in swelling and sometimes pain. It is exacerbated by physical activity such as heavy lifting.
84. Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 106.
85. Id. at 110.
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factors not measured by the study such as "more isolated work settings,
multiple employers, or temporary employment."'86 Research on age 87 and
gender 88 as factors has found mixed results.
A recent study discovered that more rural survivors than urban
survivors take early retirement and that fewer rural survivors receive
paid disability benefits.8 9 Because more rural workers have physical
jobs, the authors hypothesized that the higher incidence of manual work
limited survivors' ability to remain employed because of the effects of
cancer and its treatment. 90 Additionally, rural survivors have less access
to psychosocial resources, leading to higher rates of emotional distress
that may also encourage retirement. 91 Finally, both manual jobs and rural
homes are associated with reduced availability of disability benefits,
which may explain the lower number of rural survivors receiving such
benefits.92
3.

Type of Work

Individuals with more physical jobs are less likely to remain
employed both during and after treatment. Significant percentages of
breast and prostate cancer survivors who had jobs requiring physical

86. Id
87. See, e.g., Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 193 (finding only slightly higher retirement
rate among cancer survivors compared to general population); de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 760
(showing no clear association between age and unemployment for cancer survivors); Hassett et al.,
supra note 76, at 2778 (finding older women with cancer more likely to experience a change in
employment than younger women); Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (noting that some studies in
meta-analysis showed younger age associated with likelihood of return to work); Spelten et al.,
supra note 59, at 129 (finding in meta-analysis of fourteen studies that most showed no relationship
between age and return to work, but one showed increasing age negatively associated with work);
Markowski, supra note 13, at 118 (finding cancer-free survivors are not likely to retire sooner than
individuals with no history of cancer while cancer survivors with recurrence retire sooner).
88. See, e.g., Short et al., supra note 36, at 1296-97 (showing higher disability rates for women
than for men); Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (showing some studies in meta-analysis found
females less likely to retum to work); Moran et al., supra note 72, at 511 (showing similar
employment effects for both genders except that men had a larger reduction in hours and also had
greater employment reductions than women if they had recurrence, metastasis, or new cancers);
Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 129 (finding in meta-analysis of fourteen studies no relationship
between gender and return to work); Markowski, supra note 13, at 41, 131 (finding female cancer
survivors with greater levels of education were more likely to work while the same was not true for
men and that stage of cancer affects continuation of employment for men but not women).
89. Michelle Sowden et al., The Impact of Cancer Diagnosis on Employment: Is There a
Difference Between Ruraland Urban Populations?,8 J. CANCER SURV1VORSHIP 213, 216 (2014).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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work reported physical disabilities 93 at twelve and eighteen months
following diagnosis.94 Those with disabilities were more likely to leave
the workforce. 95 Cancer survivors from low-income families are also
less likely to work following cancer diagnosis, 96 although those who
continued to work were not more likely to reduce their hours or change
jobs.9 7 Lower income survivors were more likely to report a broad range
of negative work experiences in the two years following diagnosis,
including discharge, layoff, denial of a raise or promotion, demotion, or
transfer. 98 The tendency of low-income survivors to leave work almost
certainly has some relationship to type of work, but may have some
independent force as well.99 Quality of life may have less association
with work for lower income individuals.100 It is also possible that lower
income survivors may be eligible for government benefits that replace
more of pre-cancer income and provide some health benefits so that the
urgency to return to work is less. Indeed, these low-income jobs may not
provide health insurance benefits so that unemployment is not associated
with loss of health insurance coverage.
4.

Source of Health Insurance

Because employment provides health insurance for many individuals
in the United States, the source of health insurance has been examined as
a factor in determining employment outcomes for individuals with
cancer. Further, the absence of insurance has been demonstrated to cause
93. The study used the definition of disability from the International Classification of
Functioning, Disability and Health: "[L] imitations in physical or mental functions, caused by one or
more medical conditions, in carrying out socially defined tasks or roles." Oberst et al., supra note
38, at 323.
94. Id. at 326-27.
95. Id.At twelve months post-diagnosis, sixty percent of women and twenty-nine percent of men
reported physical disability resulting from cancer, while at eighteen months post-diagnosis, the
disability rates had declined to thirty-six percent for women and seventeen percent for men. Id. at
326. Reports of cognitive disability among those with jobs requiring cognitive tasks were less
prevalent, but still present. Id.
96. Bouknight et al., supra note 70, at 347; Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (finding a number of
studies showing both lower income and manual labor associated with reduced likelihood of
employment); Blinder et al., supra note 81, at 1671 (finding that low income survivors of various
ethnicities did not have the same rates of return to work as higher income white survivors); Steiner,
supra note 77, at 145.
97. Steiner, supra note 77, at 145.
98. Miao Yu et al., Employment Experience of CancerSurvivors 2 Years Post-Diagnosis in the
Study of CancerSurvivors-I,6 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 210,212- 13, 217 (2012).
99. See Blinder et al., supra note 81, at 1669.
100. Id. at 1672.
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poor health outcomes for cancer patients.'' Thus maintenance 1of
02
insurance is important to reduce treatment costs and save lives.
Evidence demonstrates that cancer survivors with employer-provided

health insurance are more likely to remain employed 10 3 and to work
more hours than those with health insurance through another source,
such as a working spouse. 10 4 When married women with employer-based
health insurance were compared with similarly situated women with

insurance from another source, a study found that at least some survivors
were working and working more hours than they would without the need
to maintain health insurance coverage.' 05 While maintaining
employment may appear to be a beneficial outcome, these workers may
have adverse health outcomes as a result of continuing to work, as
compliance with the best treatment options may be difficult or
10 6
impossible to reconcile with the need for continued employment.

Additionally, some employees may be constrained in their career
development because of a concern that changing jobs might affect their
ability to obtain affordable health insurance coverage that would cover
future cancer
treatment if needed, and residual effects of past
07
treatment.1
Employer-based health insurance not only spurs continued
employment and increased hours of work, but it also limits job changes
for cancer survivors.10 8 While cancer survivors who did not have health
insurance from their employer changed jobs more often than other

101. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Acute Myeloid Leukemia: How the UninsuredFare, 117 CANCER
4772, 4772, 4776 (2011); Cathy J. Bradley et al., Differences in Breast Cancer Diagnosis and
Treatment: Experiences of Insuredand Uninsured Women in a Safety-Net Setting, 45 INQUIRY 323,
328 (2008) [hereinafter Breast CancerDiagnosis].
102. Breast CancerDiagnosis,supra note 101, at 328.
103. See Cathy J. Bradley et al., Employment-Contingent Health Insurance, Illness, and Labor
Supply of Women: Evidencefrom Married Women with Breast Cancer, 16 HEALTH ECON. 719, 732
(2006) [hereinafter Employment-Contingent Health Insurance]; Employer-Provided Health
Insurance,supra note 64, at 841, 848; Employment and Cancer,supra note 60, at 51; Kaan Tunceli
et al., Cancer Survivorship, Health Insurance, and Employment TransitionsAmong Older Workers,
46 INQUIRY 17, 29 (2009). These studies preceded the implementation of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, which has expanded the availability of health insurance and limited the
exclusion of preexisting conditions. It is too early to assess the impact of that law, but it should limit
the constraining effects of health insurance for at least some cancer survivors.
104. Employment-ContingentHealth Insurance, supra note 103, at 732; Steiner, supranote 77, at
141-42; Tunceli et al., supranote 103, at 26.
105. Employment-ContingentHealth Insurance,supranote 103, at 732.
106. Id.
107. Steiner, supra note 77, at 142-43.
108. Id. at 143; Tunceli et al., supranote 103, at 29.
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employees, those whose health insurance was tied to their employment
changed jobs less frequently.' 0 9 As one group of scholars noted:
Not only are survivors handicapped in advancing their careers or
pursuing leisure interests by their need for health insurance, but
those who have continuing health problems as a result of cancer
and treatment may be less able to accommodate changes in their
health or functional status by changing jobs or cutting back on
work. In these ways, survivors pay a higher "price" for health
insurance that affects their quality of life and adds to the
economic burden of cancer. 10
5.

Employer Support andAccommodation

Studies reflect the importance of workplace support and
accommodation for survivors' successful return to work. Perceived
support and accommodation are positively associated with working for
survivors and perceived discrimination is negatively associated with
continuing to work."' Reports of discrimination were not widespread in
those studies that asked survivors about discriminatory treatment,
however. 112 Not only was support from employers and a flexible work

109. Tunceli et al., supranote 103, at 29.
110. Id.
111. Blinder et al., supra note 34, at 768-69; Bouknight et al., supra note 70, at 345; Bradley &
Bednarek, supranote 59, at 189; M.L. Lindbohm et al., Cancer as the Cause of Changes in Work
Situation (A NOCWO Study), 20 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 805, 810-11 (2010); Mehnert, supra note 46,
at 122-23 (meta-analysis of sixty-four studies showing perceived employer accommodation
increased likelihood of return to work while perceived discrimination decreased it, and the
availability of flexible work arrangements increased the probability of working during treatment);
Moskowitz et al., supra note 62, at 177 (finding discrimination, poor treatment, and denial of
accommodations by employer significantly related to both ability to work and maintenance of
employment); Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 108; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128-29
(conducting a meta-analysis of fourteen studies from different countries and finding that support and
accommodation of flexible work hours and workloads was positively associated with return to work
but citing one study from Canada finding employer discrimination was not "significantly related to
return to work" and "did not seem to be a more prevalent problem among cancer survivors than in a
control group"); Tiedtke et al., supra note 34, at 677, 680, 682 (conducting a meta-analysis of six
studies from three different countries). The Canadian study found that eighteen percent of cured
cancer survivors reported discrimination, twenty-one percent of cancer survivors with a poor
prognosis reported discrimination, and fifteen percent of the control group reported discrimination.
Deborah Ehrmann-Feldmann et al., Perceived DiscriminationAgainst Cured CancerPatients in the
Workforce, 136 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 719, 722 (1987).
112. Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 52; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128 (metaanalysis of fourteen studies from different countries); Yu et al., supra note 98, at 215 (finding only
9.3% of cancer survivors reported discrimination at work but the study separately reported negative
working experiences such as layoff and termination that might also have been the result of
discrimination. Also the study reported lack of support from the employer as a significant problem
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environment significant in association with work continuation after a
cancer diagnosis, but support of coworkers was also important. 1 3
Among the accommodations that made survivors more likely to remain
employed were a return-to-work meeting with the employer, flexible
work schedules, paid sick leave, assistance with certain work tasks, and
control over the type or amount of work. 114 The importance of
accommodation cut across demographic lines and applied regardless of
type of work or type of cancer."'
C.

Summary

The good news is that many cancer patients are able to work, some
with little or no disruption in employment. Others, however, have work
disruptions of various lengths, depending on the type of cancer, the
treatment and the job, and even after return to work need
accommodation. Some cancer survivors are unable to continue working
because of their cancer. Low income workers and workers with physical
jobs are less likely to be employed after a cancer diagnosis, and some
studies also find race and ethnicity associated with lower employment
levels. Insurance also has a constraining effect--cancer survivors who
have employer-based health insurance are more likely to remain
employed. In some cases, working may exacerbate symptoms and
psychological stress, while in others it may have positive benefits for the
survivor.

which could encompass failure to accommodate, which under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
constitutes discrimination). A Korean study, however, found discrimination against cancer patients
to be a more significant problem. Jae-Hyun Park et al., Changes in Employment Status and
Experience of Discrimination Among Cancer Patients: Findings from a Nationwide Survey in
Korea, 19 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 1303, 1306 (2010).
113. Spelten et al., supranote 59, at 128.
114. Blinder et al., supra note 34, at 5-6 (finding flexibility in work schedule and job tasks,
medical leave and assistance with physical job tasks to be important accommodations); Anja
Mehnert et al., Employment Challengesfor CancerSurvivors, 10 CANCER 2151, 2153 (2013) (citing
studies showing the importance of, inter alia, a retum-to-work meeting, flexible working conditions,
training, and counseling); Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 108 (finding paid sick leave and a
flexible work schedule to be important accommodations); Pryce et al., supra note 40, at 87-90
(showing the importance of flexible work schedules, paid time off, sick leave in excess of the legal
minimum, and changes in the physical environment in remaining employed); Tiedtke et al., supra
note 34, at 681 (finding flexibility in schedule and work, assistance with work tasks, changes in
work tasks, and gradual assimilation back into the workplace to be valued accommodations).
115. See Employment and Cancer,supra note 60, at 51-52; Short et al., supranote 36, at 12991300 (emphasizing the importance of accommodation and support over the long-term); Mujahid et
al., supra note 75, at 108; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 129; Park et al., supra note 112, at 130607.
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Having reviewed the research on cancer and employment, I turn now
to the question of what implications this data has for the law. Some of
the factors that affect employment, such as the type of cancer and race
and ethnicity, are outside anyone's control. Law, medicine, and
employers can impact the other factors, however, such as type of
treatment, type of work, employer support and accommodation, and
source of insurance. These controllable factors can have some mitigating
impact on the effects of race and ethnicity. As noted in the medical
research, many of the medical, legal, and social interventions designed16
to increase employment have focused on the individual with cancer.'
The law, however, has the ability to spur structural and policy changes
that may increase employment of cancer survivors.
III.

THE LAWS

In the United States, there is a patchwork of laws that provide some
protection for cancer survivors (and others) in achieving the goals
discussed above. Among the relevant laws are the following: the Family
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which provides for employment leave
for serious medical conditions; the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), which prohibits employment discrimination against
individuals with disabilities and requires employers to offer them
reasonable accommodations to enable employment; the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("COBRA"),117 which
provides for continuation of health insurance following termination of
employment; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA"), 118 which bars preexisting condition limitations in health
insurance under certain conditions; the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"),11 9 which governs employee benefit plans; the
Social Security Act,120 which provides income and Medicare121 or
Medicaid 122 health insurance coverage for disabled individuals; and the

116. Moscowitz et al., supra note 62, at 174.
117. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82.
118. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
119. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 31

U.S.C.).
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (2012).
121. Id.§§ 1395-1395ccc.
122. Id. §§ 301-1397mm.
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recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 123 which is
designed to assist individuals with preexisting conditions in obtaining
health insurance and encourage employers to provide, and individuals to
obtain, health insurance. In addition to these federal laws, many states
have laws that offer additional benefits and protections for cancer
survivors. 124

This Article initiates what is contemplated to be a long-term, multistage assessment of these laws against the research on cancer and
employment, accompanied by recommendations for change. Of course,
to some extent all of the legal protections are interrelated and changes in
one may affect or vitiate the need for changes in another. But as is
typical in American employment law, our country has taken a piecemeal
approach to addressing the issues with a variety of legal mechanisms.
The project begins with an analysis of the laws that require leave and
other accommodations and prohibit discrimination based on disability.
The federal FMLA and the ADA are closely related pieces of legislation
that work together to protect workers with medical problems and
preserve their employment.1 25 The FMLA requires employers of a
certain size to provide leave to employees with serious medical
conditions, 26 while the ADA prevents discrimination and requires
accommodation of disabilities. 127 Since leave may be an
accommodation, these laws are interrelated. Thus this Article assesses
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029.
124. See, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12940 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment/housing because of "medical condition"); id. § 12926 (defining
"medical condition" as "[a]ny health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer
or a record or history of cancer" and extending protection to persons with "genetic characteristics"
which "cause" cancer, including the children of those with cancer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1
(West, Westlaw through 2013) (prohibiting housing and employment discrimination against
individuals with disabilities); Soules v. Mount Holiness Mem'l Park, 808 A.2d 863, 867 (N.J.
Super. 2002) (finding individual with cancer had a disability "regardless of the length of the
recuperative period or the temporal consequences of his cancer" and citing earlier case finding
individual with cancer who had mastectomy had disability because any illness that causes
amputation is a disability); infra notes 325-26, 410-11 and accompanying text.
125. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2012), which bars disability
discrimination by the federal government, federal contractors, and federal fund recipients will also
be considered to the extent that it applies. Congress provided that the ADA standards for
employment discrimination apply to discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
§ 794(d). A significant difference between the two statutes, however, is that the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 specifically requires affirmative action on the part of federal agencies and government
contractors. Id. §§ 791, 793.
126. See Family Medical Leave Act, id §§ 2601-2654.
127. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
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each of these laws and discusses similar state laws that provide greater
protection and/or benefits to cancer patients.
A.

Normative Goals

Before assessing what approach the law should take with regard to
employment and cancer, it is important to determine the goals that the
128
law should be designed to achieve. Broadly, it seems beyond debate
that cancer survivors should have the basic human rights of sufficient
income and resources for a minimum standard of living1 29 along with
access to necessary medical treatment. 30 Additionally, the psychological
benefits of working131 suggest that those cancer patients who can work
(and, importantly, those that also want to work) should have the
opportunity to do so--even when they would have sufficient resources
without work. The employment goal provides a societal benefit as well
since individuals who are working at living wage jobs pay state, federal,
and Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes and, in most cases, do not
draw significantly on public benefits. 132 For those for whom working
interferes with treatment, enabling them to support themselves and
obtain treatment without working should be the goal.
The question of how to achieve the goals, including what role the law
should play, leaves more room for debate. For those survivors able and
desiring to work, the ability to obtain or maintain a job without
discrimination is likely to meet these goals if the job provides affordable

128. While some might disagree on how to achieve these goals and what sort of cost/benefit
analysis to apply to efforts to achieve them, the goals themselves seem incontrovertible. The United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the following: "Everyone has the right to
work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment," G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), Art. 23(1) (Dec. 10,
1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtm; "Everyone who works has
the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary by other means of social protection," id. at Art.
23(3); and everyone has "the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability.... or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control," id.at Art. 25(1). See
also BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 91, 112 (arguing for living wage jobs that provide
"physical, economic, social and health security" as a matter of equity and noting that employment
law in the United States is strong on efficiency and weak on equity). For those who disagree with
the goals, there really is nothing to debate.
129. This would include adequate shelter, food, and clothing.
130. Such medical treatment includes any medication necessary.
131. See supra notes 34, 44, 112-13 and accompanying text.
132. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Relieving (Most o)9the Tension: A Review Essay of Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictionsof the DisabilityRights Movement, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 761, 802-03 (2011).
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health insurance coverage, adequate work hours and pay, and the
flexibility to continue necessary medical treatment. 13 3 For those unable
to work at a job that will provide these benefits who have no other
resources to meet these goals, some form of income support and
affordable health insurance or treatment coverage will be necessary.
These goals are important not only for the individuals involved but also
for society as a whole. The economy suffers as a result of reduced
productivity, locking employees into jobs that do not take advantage of
their skills and abilities because of their cancer, costly health problems
resulting from inability to obtain proper treatment in a timely fashion,
bankruptcies, and poverty. But in determining how to achieve these
goals, we must consider where the costs fall. If the goals are achieved
through employment laws such as the ADA and FMLA, they will fall on
employers. Thus, in determining how to approach the problem, we must
consider not only issues of equity for cancer survivors but also
efficiency for business and society.134 In considering efficiency, we must
be aware of the fact that American business must compete in a
globalized economy.
B.

Family MedicalLeave Act

Because the availability of leave, and particularly paid leave, is an
important determinant of continued employment, the FMLA will be
analyzed first. This federal statute, which covers employers with fifty or
more employees, 3 5 entitles eligible employees with serious health
conditions to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave in a
twelve-month period.1 36 To be eligible, an employee must have worked
for the employer for one year and worked at least 1250 hours in the past
year.' 37 Health insurance must be continued during the leave as if the
133. Of course, not all jobs currently available in the United States meet these requirements.
BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 91. Cancer survivors should be no more likely to end up in such
jobs than other employees, however, and should not end up in those jobs because they have cancer.
Further, since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, insurance is available to many,
though not all, through means other than employment.
134. I rely here on the framework adopted by Befort and Budd for evaluating employment laws.
They should balance the goals of equity, efficiency, and voice for workers. BEFORT & BUDD, supra
note 30, at 129-30.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2012). While state employers are covered by the FMLA,
employees cannot collect damages from state employers who violate the FMLA's provisions
dealing with the employee's own serious health condition. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md.,
U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1335 (2012).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
137. See id. § 2611(2)(A).
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employee was working.1 38 The law allows employees to take the leave
intermittently if needed, 139 though the employee must make a reasonable
effort to schedule treatment so as not to unduly disrupt the employer's
operations.14 0 The employer has the option to alter work duties to avoid
14
disruption caused by intermittent leave for planned treatment.'
Employees may opt to take any paid leave available as part of the FMLA
leave and the employer may require the use of paid leave as well.142 An
additional benefit of the FMLA is the caregiver provision, which allows
employees time off to care for family members with serious health
conditions. 143 Finally, the FMLA prohibits retaliation against individuals
who take advantage of its provisions.44
The FMLA has the potential to assist with the needs of cancer
survivors by providing job-protected leave for treatment and recovery
since cancer will almost always constitute a serious health condition. 145
The provisions for intermittent leave can be particularly helpful by
allowing patients to take periodic time off for treatments like radiation
and chemotherapy. Employees can take the necessary leave without
fearing loss of either their job or their essential health insurance. While
employers initially feared that FMLA leave would impose significant
burdens, it appears that most employers do not replace employees on
leave and the overwhelming majority of employees on leave return to
work for the employer, so no costly permanent replacement is
necessary. 146 Further, a relatively small percentage of workers take
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. § 2614(c)(1).
See id. § 2612(b)(1).
See id § 2612(e)(2)(A).
See id. § 2612(b)(2).

142. See id § 2612(d)(2)(A).
143. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). The FMLA also provides leave for birth or adoption of a child. Id.
§ 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B).
144. Id. § 2615(b); Drew v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00907, 2012 WL 2341690 (S.D.
Ohio June 20, 2012) (denying summary judgment to employer because jury could find FMLA
retaliation where plaintiff was laid off during reduction in force while on FMLA leave for surgery,
during which time her fianc6 was diagnosed with cancer, and others with similar disciplinary
records were not laid off); Scott v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:11-CV-02094-G, 2012
WL 136162 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim that he was
denied a transfer in retaliation for taking FMLA leave to care for his wife with cancer).
145. Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2006). "Serious health condition is
defined" by the C.F.R. as "an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental condition that
involves inpatient care as defined in § 825.114 or continuing treatment by a health care provider as
defined in § 825.115." 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2014).
146. Gayle Cinquegrani, FMLA Leave Not Overly Disruptiveor Costly andShould Be Expanded,
Panelists Contend, 26 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-7 (Feb. 27, 2013); ABT AsSOCS., FAMILY
MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL REPORT 109, 145-46 (2013), available at
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intermittent leave and FMLA leave does not impose a substantial burden

on most employers. 147

But there are significant limitations in the FMLA's benefits for cancer
survivors. Because of the limitations on employer and employee
coverage, many employees cannot take advantage of the leave provided.
Our hypothetical survivor Sarah, for example, has not been employed for
a year and thus has no FMLA entitlement, although her employer is of
sufficient size to be covered. A recent study found that approximately
forty-one percent of workers are ineligible for FMLA coverage, leaving
large numbers of workers outside the scope of the statute.148 More than a
third of worksites surveyed that were not covered by the law had
employees 49
who took leave for reasons that would qualify for FMLA
protection. 1
Further, FMLA leave is unpaid, and while paid leave can be
50
substituted if available, many employees taking leave receive no pay. 1
And because of employer limits on paid leave, the more time an
employee takes, the less likely that it will be fully paid.' 5' Notably,
however, employees eligible for FMLA leave were more likely to
receive pay for leave based on the employer's policies. 152 Additionally,
employees in higher income brackets are substantially more likely to
have fully paid leave, while employees in lower income brackets are

http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/finla/FMLA-2012-Technical-Report.pdf. Most of the data in this
section comes from the most recent study funded by the U.S. Department of Labor, which
administers the law. Id. at i. That study is not limited to individuals with cancer. Id.
147. ABT AssocS., supra note 146, at 162.

148. Id. at i, 21-22. While some states have similar leave statutes, most do not cover smaller
employers and most do not provide longer leave periods. See State Family and Medical Leave Laws,
NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/state-family-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx.
149. ABT ASSOCS., supra note 146, at 84. This includes leave for childbirth and parenting as well
as leave for the employee's own serious health condition or that of an immediate family member.
While these employees may have been provided leave, the absence of FMLA protections means that
the employees were not guaranteed a return to their job or insurance continuation.
150. Id. at ii, 97. About a third of employees received no pay. Id. at 97. Forty-eight percent
received full pay and another seventeen percent partial pay. Id. at 98. Another study, based on data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, found that only 57.1% of employees have access to any paid
sick days on their job. Sarah Jane Glynn & Jane Farrell, Latinos Least Likely to Have PaidLeave or
20,
2012),
PROGRESS
2
(Nov.
CTR.
FOR
AM.
Workplace
Flexibility,
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/1 l/GlynnLatinosPaidLeavel .pdf.
151. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at ii, 97. Only forty-one percent of employees with leaves of
more than ten days, which probably includes almost all individuals with cancer, received full pay.
Id. at 97.
152. Id. at 102-03.
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much more likely to have no paid leave. 53 Paid leave also varies by race
and ethnicity, with Latinos least likely to have paid sick leave, followed
by African-Americans.1 54 This may help explain why Latinas with
cancer suffer more unemployment than non-Latina workers. 155 Almost
two-thirds of surveyed employees reported difficulty making ends meet
as a result of taking leave with partial or no pay.' 56 While our
hypothetical survivor, Sarah, has paid leave, it is voluntarily provided by
her employer, and is unlikely to be sufficient for her needs. 57 Given that
cancer survivors in the extensive studies analyzed above indicated that
paid leave was an important accommodation in retaining employment,
these findings regarding the limits of paid leave are significant.
Another limitation of the FMLA that may affect cancer survivors is
the length of the leave. Only twelve weeks are available in each twelvemonth period. If an employee needs more leave, FMLA does not protect
the employee's job.' 5 8As demonstrated by the research on cancer and
employment, treatment for some cancers may affect the employee's
health in ways that limit the ability to work for more than twelve weeks,
regardless of whether the leave is taken intermittently or in succession.
Even if Sarah was covered by the FMLA, her need for leave might
exceed the twelve weeks, especially if her employer's opposition to her
shift changing accommodation persists.
C.

Americans with DisabilitiesAct

The Americans with Disabilities Act has broader protections than the
FMLA and therefore greater potential to preserve employment for
cancer survivors. After a brief introduction to the statute, this Article
will analyze the ADA's application to the identified needs of cancer
survivors. The employment provisions of the ADA took effect in

153. Id. at 99; Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 4.
154. Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 2. Latinos are significantly below the other ethnic groups
in leave availability, with only 38.4% having paid sick leave, compared to 57.4% of AfricanAmericans, the next lowest group. Id. Latinos are also far less likely to have other leave that might
be taken in lieu of sick leave, such as paid vacation. Id.
155. See supranotes 81, 84-85 and accompanying text.
156. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at 106.
157. Voluntarily provided leave may not be an enforceable benefit if it is not provided in an
employment contract. Even if it is, lung cancer is a debilitating cancer that will likely require more
than the two weeks of leave that Sarah has available. See supranote 61.
158. The study, depending on the method of counting for leaves that were in progress at the time
of the interview, indicated that either fourteen percent or seventeen percent of leaves were sixty or
more days in length. ABT ASSOC., supranote 146, at 68.
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1992.159 The law covers employees of employers with fifteen or more
employees, 60 and prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, individuals with a record of disabilities, and individuals who
are perceived to have a disability.1 61 Further, to be protected from
discrimination in employment, the individual must be a "qualified
individual" which is defined as someone who can perform the "essential
functions" of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. 62 The
definition of disability was substantially amended in 2008, effective
2009, to broaden the coverage of the Act, which had been restricted by
judicial interpretation. 163 Cancer survivors who meet the definition of
disability and are denied initial employment or terminated or
discriminated against on the job because of their cancer have a remedy
under the statute.'64
As discussed in Section III.B.5, employer accommodation of cancer
survivors is an important determinant of employment. In addition to
prohibiting discrimination, the ADA requires covered employers to
accommodate individuals with disabilities to enable them to do the job,
so long as the accommodation is reasonable, allows the employee to
perform the essential functions of the job, and does not impose undue
hardship on the employer. 165 This implicates the flexibility in work that
many survivors indicate is crucial to maintaining employment.
The following sections will first review how the definition of
disability has been applied to cancer survivors both before and after the
2008 amendments. Then the anti-discrimination and accommodation
provisions most relevant to the needs of cancer survivors will be
analyzed for their effectiveness.
1.

A HistoricalPerspective
In 2000, Barbara Hoffman, General Counsel of the National Coalition

159. President Bush signed the ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), on July 26,
1990. Title I became effective July 26, 1992 for employers with twenty-five or more employees and
two years later for employers with fifteen or more employees. S. REP. No. 101-116, 2 (1989).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2012). Thus, the law does not protect employees of small
employers and independent contractors.
161. See id. § 12102 (defining disability); id § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination).
162. See id. § 12112 (barring discrimination); id. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual" with
disability).
163. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (barring discrimination in hiring, promotion, discharge, and other
terms and conditions of employment).
165. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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for Cancer Survivorship, comprehensively evaluated the effectiveness of
the ADA as applied to cancer survivors.166 She analyzed a series of cases
decided under the statute, finding that plaintiffs either prevailed or
survived summary judgment in fewer than half. 167 The problem she
identified, the Catch-22, was that courts found that plaintiffs who could
work had no disability, but those who were limited in their ability to
work were not "qualified individuals with disabilities"'168 and therefore
not protected by the Act. 169 Capturing the problem by describing the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 170 Hoffman
noted:
Under the Fifth Circuit's logic, had Ellison chosen to take
several months of medical leave during the first stage of her
treatment, and then returned to work half-time for the next
several weeks, she would have demonstrated a "substantial
limiting impairment" of her ability to work. Thus, under the
Fifth Circuit's analysis, those employees who work the hardest
to maintain their jobs are precisely the ones denied protection
under the ADA. Bringing this irony full circle, the Fifth Circuit
would doubtlessly have concluded that had Phyllis Ellison taken
an extended medical leave from work, she would not have been
"otherwise qualified" for her job, and therefore it would have
caught her with the other prong of the Catch-22. 7 '
In the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, the courts were more
166. Barbara Hoffman, Between a Disabilityand a Hard Place: The CancerSurvivors' Catch-22
of Proving Disability Status Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 59 MD. L. REv. 352 (2000).
167. Id. at 407-08.
168. "Qualified individual with a disability" is a statutory term, defined as one who can do the
essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
169. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 353. This Catch-22 is not, of course, limited to cancer survivors
and was one of the motivating factors for amendment. See Stephen F. Befort, Let's Try This Again:
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the "Regarded As" Prong of the
Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1001-19 (detailing the concerns that led
to the amendments and the Congressional response). For additional criticism of judicial
interpretation of the ADA, see, for example, Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is "Because of the
Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation,
and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323 (2006); Ruth Colker, The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999);
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 19 (2000); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under FederalAnti-Discrimination
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 91,
91-92 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the
ADA: A Return to the DarkAges, 52 ALA. L. REv. 321 (2000).
170. 85 F.3d 187 (1996).

171. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 380 (citations omitted).
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willing to look at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") regulations and the legislative history of the ADA. These
authorities indicate an intent both to include cancer as a disability under
the statute and to find that hospitalization, which most cancer survivors
undergo at some point, establishes a record of impairment sufficient to
meet the definition for statutory coverage. 172 Additionally, Hoffman
found that plaintiffs who alleged disability under all three prongs of the
definition were more likely to succeed. 7 3 Finally, the type of cancer
seemed to have an impact
74 on the determination of whether it met the

definition of disability. 1
While Hoffman identified significant difficulties for cancer survivors

bringing ADA cases, she offered a blueprint on how to overcome the
hurdles created by the courts. 175 Despite her good advice and somewhat
optimistic conclusion that cancer survivors in some cases might
overcome the challenges, she conducted a subsequent analysis that
confirmed that plaintiffs continued to face dismal prospects under the
ADA between 2000 and 2008.176 In 2008, Congress amended the statute,
responding to the judicial narrowing of the definition of disability and
172. Id. at 409-11.
173. Id. at 408-09.
174. Id. at 411-12.
175. Id. at 432-38.
176. See Barbara Hoffman, The Law of Intended Consequences: Did the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct Amendments Act Make It Easierfor CancerSurvivor to Prove DisabilityStatus?, 68
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 843, 858-67 (2013). For case examples, see Turner v. Sullivan
University Systems, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (finding patient with breast cancer
was not limited in major life activities despite her inability to perform any activities that required
lifting, including portions of her job, and thus was not disabled under the ADA); Treiber v.
Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 199 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding that music teacher with breast
cancer, who underwent a lumpectomy, chemotherapy, and suffered limited movement in her left
arm, was not disabled under the ADA because the impairment had not sufficiently interfered with
major life activities); and Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.N.H.
2002) (finding the plaintiff with breast cancer requiring an eight month leave of absence for
treatment consisting of chemotherapy, mastectomy, and radiation was not disabled because her
impairment was too short term to be considered substantially limiting of major life activities and
therefore, a statutory disability). For a study that shows the dismal success rate for all ADA
plaintiffs, see Amy Albright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update,
29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513, 515 (2005) (showing employers won the
following percentages of ADA employment cases between 2000 and 2004: 2000-96.4%; 200 195.7%; 2002-94.5%; 2003-98%; 2004-97%). Interestingly, a pre-amendment study of EEOC
claims filed by cancer survivors found that the EEOC was more likely to find reasonable cause in
cancer cases compared to other disabilities. See Michael Feuerstein et al., Pattern of Workplace
Disputes in CancerSurvivors: A PopulationStudy ofADA Claims, 1 J. CANCER SURVIVORSH1P 185,
191-92 (2007). Administrative success before the EEOC, however, does not necessarily translate to
success in court. A few plaintiffs did manage to establish cancer as a disability under the statute
despite the difficulties, however. Hoffman, supranote 166, at 409-12.
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177
consequent difficulties for plaintiffs bringing ADA claims.

2.

The ADA Amendments Act: Restoring the Act's Coverage

Congress sought to redress the exact problem Hoffman identified:
The difficulty plaintiffs faced establishing a current disability or a record
of disability, or, alternatively, that their employer regarded them as
having a disability. 178 As a result of this difficulty, most plaintiffs failed
to meet the first requirement necessary for coverage under the statute,
never reaching the question of whether they were discriminated against
or unlawfully denied accommodation. While the definition of disability
was not substantially changed, Congress expressly rejected the Supreme
Court cases that had narrowed the definition of disability and specified
that the definition of disability should be broadly construed. 179 Further,
Congress clarified the interpretation of the terms "substantially limits,"
"major life activities," and "regarded as" in the definition of disability. 8 0
In defining major life activities, Congress included "the operation of a
major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the
immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions."181
Congress directed the EEOC to issue regulations implementing the
statutory changes, which it did, effective May 24, 2011. 182 In addition to
the general broadening of the definition of disability, several provisions
in the regulations will help cancer survivors meet the definition. Among
the EEOC's rules of construction of disability derived explicitly from the
statute is the following: "An impairment that is episodic or in remission
is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when
active. ' 83 In support of this regulation the EEOC cited the legislative
177. See Befort, supra note 169, at 1001-19.
178. See id; Hoffman, supranote 176, at 846-48.
179. Befort, supra note 169, at 1013; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REv.
COLLOQUY 217 (2008); see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-235, §§ 2(b)(1)-(5),
3(4)(A), 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012)) ("The definition of disability
in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, tothe
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.").
180. Befort, supra note 169, at 1014-18.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
182. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630).
183. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2014); 29 U.S.C. §12102(4)(D) (2012).
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history's rejection of cases finding cancer in remission to be too "shortlived" to meet the test of substantial limitation.184 Further, Section
1630.20)(3) cites certain impairments whose coverage will be
"predictable, consistent, and workable," leading to a conclusion "in
virtually all cases" that there is either an actual disability or a history of a
disability.1 85 Among the conditions cited is cancer, as it "should easily
be concluded that ...cancer substantially limits normal cell growth,"
which is, according to the amendments, a major life activity. 86 The
explanatory comments quote Representative Steny Hoyer, one of the
original sponsors of the ADA, stating "we could not have fathomed that
people with diabetes, . .. cancer,... and other disabilities would have
their ADA claims denied because they would be considered too
87
functional to meet the definition of disability.'
Both the statute and the regulations seem designed to ensure that,
among others, cancer survivors will be covered by the ADA. Although it
is far too early for a complete assessment, 188 the cases decided postamendment have largely found cancer survivors covered by the
statute. 189 Plaintiffs have survived defense motions for summary
184. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. at 17011 (citing H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 2 (2008)).
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3).
186. Id.
187. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 17012 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 2 at 10
(2008)).
188. Because the statute has not been found to apply retroactively, relatively few ADAAA cases
have reached the decisional level. See Boitnott v. Coming, Inc., 669 F.3d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 2012)
(holding employee with leukemia not disabled under pre-amendment ADA and no retroactive
application); Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., 581 F.3d 516, 521-23 & n.1(7th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the amendments did not apply retroactively and that the plaintiff with leukemia could
not show substantial impairment of a major life activity or that he was regarded as having such an
impairment).
189. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING START: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
COURT
DECISIONS
UNDER
THE
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT (2013), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2013/07232013 (finding plaintiffs under the ADAAA have been
largely successful in getting courts to accept the EEOC's determination that cancer is virtually
always a disability); Hoffman, supra note 176, at 882 (reviewing post-amendment disability claims
by cancer survivors and finding that more claims were filed with the EEOC and resolved favorably
to plaintiffs, that courts denied defendants' pre-trial motions based on lack of disability more
frequently, and that no court had determined that a cancer survivor was "too healthy to be disabled,
yet too ill to work"). The exceptions, where cancer was not found disabling, are pro se cases that
failed to survive motions to dismiss. See Fierro v. Knight Transp., No. EP-12-CV-00218-DCG,
2012 WL 4321304, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2012) (finding plaintiff did not allege facts from
which the court could infer any limitation on major life activities); Brandon v. O'Mara, No. 10-CV5174-RJH, 2011 WL 4478492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (finding that because of plaintiff's limited
allegations of fatigue and lifting limitations upon her return to work after cancer treatment, her
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judgment, 190 and in some cases a favorable settlement has been

reached.1 9' EEOC experts note that more cases are surviving summary
judgment motions and more cases turn on whether the statute has been
violated, rather than whether the plaintiff is covered by the statute. 9 2 A

recent study confirmed that prior to the amendments, courts decided
74.4% of disability status summary judgment motions in favor of the
employer, while subsequent to the amendments, the percentage dropped
to 45.9%. 193 The percentage of cases in which the courts reached the
issue and decided whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a
disability jumped from 28.2% pre-amendments to 47.1% postamendments. 194 Thus, more plaintiffs successfully proved disability

status and moved to the question of whether they were qualified to do
the job, with or without accommodations. Accordingly, whether the
ADA is likely to provide real benefit to cancer survivors who want to
continue to work depends on the interpretation of the discrimination and

complaint failed to state a claim that she was disabled). Unlike other cases, see infra note 190, these
courts did not consider the fact that cancer in remission is a disability because of its impact on
normal cell growth when active. One scholar has described these as poorly litigated cases that might
come out differently with better advocacy. Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 87
TENN. L. REv. 1 (2014).
190. Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment, finding cancer in remission was a disability); Norton v. Assisted
Living Concepts, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (denying motion for summary judgment,
finding cancer in remission was a disability); Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F.
Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding
plaintiffs renal cell cancer was a disability, even in remission); Chalfont v. U.S. Electrodes, No. 102929, 2010 WL 5341846, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2010) (rejecting motion to dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff's leukemia, which was in remission, did not constitute a disability); see also Meinelt v.
P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (denying a summary
judgment motion arguing that brain tumor was not a disability where case does not state whether the
brain tumor was malignant or benign).
191. See Consent Decree, EEOC v. Southlake Comm. Mental Health Ctr., No. 2:10-CV-00444PPS-APR (N.D. Ind. Mar, 11, 2013) (settling claim that employer failed to provide reasonable
accommodation and terminated employee for missing work when she sought leave for breast cancer
treatment. Settlement required employer to consider leave as an accommodation even where
employees were not entitled to FMLA leave); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Journal Disposition Corp.,
No. 10-CV-00886-RHB (W.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2011) (settling claim by employee that employer
denied accommodation allowing employee to work part-time, and instead terminated him).
192. Patrick Dorrian, EEOC Attorney, Administrative Judge Share Insights, Tips About Amended
ADA, 196 DAILY LAB. REP. A-5 (Oct. 5, 2012); see also Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress
Intended?, 17 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 5, 27 (2013) (noting that early judicial interpretations of
the ADAAA appear to be in accord with congressional intent to reverse restrictive interpretations of
the definition of disability).
193. See Steven F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2027, 2050-51 (2013).
194. Id. at 2055.
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accommodation requirements, as well as the requirement that the
plaintiff be a qualified individual with a disability.195
3.

QualifiedIndividuals with a Disability

In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that, unlike many other
groups protected from discrimination, discrimination against individuals
with disabilities might be justified if the disability prevented the
individual from doing the job. Accordingly, the law bars only
discrimination against "qualified" individuals with disabilities.196 A
qualified individual with a disability can perform the essential functions
of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation by the
employer. 197 The issue as it arises in practice is typically intertwined
with the issues of discrimination and accommodation. Thus, the
employer may admit it acted on the basis of the disability but claim that
the disability prevented the employee from meeting the job
qualifications. 198 The employer may also assert that there is no
reasonable accommodation that would enable the employee to meet the
job qualifications that can be provided without undue hardship. 199
Professor Befort's research shows that post-ADAAA, employers are
2°°
winning more summary judgment motions based on qualified status.
Professor Porter has suggested an explanation for this. 20 1 The analysis of
essential functions of the job is more structured by the statute than the

195. Of course, it is always possible that early indications may not be an accurate predictor of
later developments. One of the very earliest ADA cases involved an executive with brain cancer
who successfully sued his employer, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.
1995), but as the law developed, plaintiffs' victories were few and far between as noted supra. The
amendments did not change the law's definition of disability and the EEOC regulations can always
be circumvented by the courts. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 86-7; Kate Webber, Correcting
the Supreme Court-Will It Listen? Using the Models of Judicial Decision-Making to Predict the
Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 305, 350-52 (2014) (indicating that
even if lower courts are currently interpreting the ADA Amendments Act consistently with
congressional intent, the Supreme Court may not do so).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
197. Id. § 12111(8).
198. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 124-25, 127 (2d Cir. 2013)
(reversing summary judgment for the employer which was granted on the basis that the employee
could not meet the job qualification of arriving on time for work because of his disability).
199. See, e.g., Spears v. Creel, No. 14-12261, 2015 WL 1651646 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2015)
(accepting employer's claim that there was no available reasonable accommodation for employee
with cancer that could be provided without undue hardship).
200. Befort, supra note 193, at 2055 (showing increase in employer wins on summary judgment
motions based on qualified status from 47.9% of cases to 69.7% of cases).
201. Porter, supra note 189, at 57.
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vague notion of reasonableness, which has never been defined by the
Supreme Court.2 °2 Thus the essential functions analysis is easier for the
courts to use, particularly in granting summary judgment to the
employer.20 3 There is often an aspect of the job that the employee cannot
do.2° If the court finds that to be an essential function, the law does not
require that function to be eliminated or reassigned. 20 5 An
accommodation is only possible if it allows modification, but not
elimination, of one of the essential functions of the job or if the
accommodation
eliminates a non-essential or marginal function of the
06
2

job.

Professor Porter's analysis of the cases suggests that while courts are
willing to require employers to accommodate employees with physical
adjustments to the workplace, such as providing equipment, they are
often unwilling to require employers to make structural changes in the
workplace as accommodations. 20 7 An example of this phenomenon from
our hypothetical survivor, Sarah, would be a characterization of working
her regular shift as an essential function of the job. Sarah's inability to
work that shift daily as a result of her treatment would render her
unqualified. This, of course, has important implications for cancer
survivors like Sarah that are explored in the following sections.
Alternatively, of course, the employer may claim that any challenged
action was based on another reason having nothing to do with the
individual's disability. In such cases, the employer may or may not
contest the employee's ability to meet the definition of "qualified
individual." Because of the relationship between qualified individual
with a disability and accommodation, qualified individual with a
disability will be discussed further in connection with accommodations.
4.

Hiring, Termination, and Other Discrimination

Where the employer denies any disability-related discrimination,
there is nothing unique about discrimination claims under the ADA once
disability is established. °8 The key to proving discrimination is showing
202. Id. at 55-56.
203. Id. at 56.
204. Id. at 57.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 54-55, 57.
208. What is unique about ADA claims as compared to those under other discrimination laws,
however, is that the more common ADA case is one where the employer admits to relying on the
disability but claims that the employee is not qualified because of the disability.
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that the employer's adverse actions are based on the disability and not on
other factors. This motive-based inquiry is fact-specific and will depend
on the evidence in the particular case, including the timing of the
employer's actions and any other evidence that suggests a motive based
on the employee's cancer.2 °9
The particular issues that are most likely to arise for cancer patients in
these pure discrimination cases are termination or discipline of an
employee allegedly based on the employee's cancer or failure to hire an
employee who has a history of cancer.210 In the case of hypothetical
survivor Sarah, the employer's recently instituted criticism of her
performance may be discrimination based on her cancer and could
ultimately lead to termination. Alternatively, her performance may in
fact be deteriorating, which would provide a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for discipline and, without improvement,
discharge. 21' The success of any challenge to the employer's action
would depend on the evidence as to the employer's motive.
An example from an actual case is Crane v. Monterrey Mushroom,
Inc.,21 2 where the court denied an employer's summary judgment
motion. In that case, Crane brought claims of discrimination based on
his diagnosis of prostate cancer and intent to take leave under the FMLA
for treatment.2 13 The employer eliminated Crane's position shortly after
his diagnosis, and he alleged he was discriminatorily selected for
209. The standard for proof on the issue of causation under the ADA is unsettled. See Quillen v.
Touchstone Med. Imaging LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 774, 780 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (discussing split
of courts on standard of proof and impact of University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v.
Nassar, _ U.S.
, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), which required proof of "but for" causation for
retaliation claims under Title VII); Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1380
(S.D. Cal. 2014) (applying the Nassarstandard to ADA retaliation claim); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of
Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062-63 (D. Or. 2013) (refusing to apply the Nassar standard
to discrimination claims under the ADA).
210. The ADA protects individuals with a record of a disability and individuals who are regarded
as having a disability but do not. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B)-(C) (2012). Pre-amendment studies of
EEOC claims found termination claims to be more prevalent for cancer survivors as compared to
claims by individuals with other conditions. Feuerstein et al., supra note 176, at 189. Also more
common were claims relating to inequitable application of terms and conditions of employment. Id.
These claims, like termination and hiring claims, will typically depend on proof of motive. Hiring
cases were not common among claims filed by cancer survivors, perhaps because of proof
difficulties. Id. at 188. For further discussion of proof problems, see infra notes 219-21 and
accompanying text.
211. Accommodation, discussed infra Part VI.B.5, might be relevant in such a determination also.
If Sarah was denied a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the job
and then be disciplined or discharged for her failure to perform adequately, the discipline or
discharge might be found to be discriminatory.
212. 910 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (E.D. Tenn. 2012).
213. Id. at 1038.
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termination.21 4 He had informed his boss in December that he might
have cancer and gave the supervisor the official diagnosis on January
13.215 Crane was notified of his layoff in early February. 1 6 There was
conflicting evidence about when the decision to terminate was madebefore or after knowledge about the cancer or potential cancer-as well
as conflicting evidence about whether the decision-maker was angry
about Crane's cancer diagnosis and its impact on his work.21 7 Based on
this material factual dispute, the court denied summary judgment,
leaving it to the jury to determine whether the layoff was discriminatory
218
or legitimate.
The reality is that ADA discrimination cases are far more likely to
challenge terminations than failures to hire. 219 Hiring cases are difficult
to win, have limited damages, and often involve plaintiffs with few
resources, making them unattractive to the plaintiffs' employment bar.22°
The problems with hiring discrimination cases are not unique to the
ADA, 22 1 nor are the potential fixes. Because of the difficulties with
hiring cases, most cancer patients will be in a better position under the
ADA if they can keep the jobs they have rather than leaving the job and
returning to the work force later.22 2 Employers have an economic
incentive to avoid hiring someone with a history of cancer, as they fear a
recurrence that might lead to costly absenteeism or expensive medical
treatment. A return to the workforce requires an explanation for absence,
214. Id. at 1039-40.
215. Id. at 1039.
216. Id. at 1040.
217. Id. at 1048-50.
218. The case was dismissed before trial on joint motion of the parties, presumably based on a
settlement. Joint Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Crane v. Monterey Mushrooms,
Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (No. 3:10-CV-00149).
219. SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 127 (2009).
220. Id. at 127-28. The EEOC has brought several hiring claims for cancer survivors, however.
See EEOC v. Dyn McDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 537 F. App'x 437, 448 (5th Cir. 2013)
(reversing summary judgment for employer on EEOC claims that employee was not hired because
of his age and his wife's cancer); EEOC v. Prof'l Freezing Servs., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 783 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (alleging failure to hire because of prostate cancer and settled with consent decree);
Complaint, EEOC v. SITA Info. Networking Computing USA, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-02818-RLV (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 24, 2011) (alleging rescission of employment offer because of diagnosis of cancer and
request for accommodation); Consent Decree, EEOC v. SITA Info. Networking Computing USA,
Inc., No. 1:1 1-cv-02818-RLV (N.D. Ga. May 6, 2013) (settling the dispute).
221. BAGENSTOS, supranote 219, at 127 n.50.
222. Evidence of persistent unemployment of cancer survivors suggests that survivors may have
difficulty finding employment after leaving the work force for cancer treatment. EmploymentContingent Health Insurance,supra note 103, at 732.
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and since any hiring discrimination will be difficult to prove, 2 23 it is most
useful to look at how the ADA might enable employees with cancer to
retain their employment.
5.

Reasonable Accommodation
A widespread finding of the cancer studies was that employer

accommodation and support was an important factor in continued

employment of cancer patients.224 This finding applied regardless of the
demographic characteristics of the cancer patients, the type of cancer, or
the type of work. 225 These findings indicate the significance of the
accommodation requirement of the ADA. Accommodations found to be
particularly important were flexible work schedules, paid sick leave,
assistance with job tasks, and control over the type and amount of
work.226 These accommodations are among the most difficult for
employers for they require flexibility in work planning and impose
burdens on both employers and employees due to workplace
restructuring and employee absence.227
The ADA states reasonable accommodation may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
223. As just one example, an employer can screen out applicants with employment gaps based on
resumes or applications. The applicant will never know the reason for the rejection. Unless an
applicant is uniquely highly qualified for a particular position, showing a rejection is based on
disability or history of a disability rather than some other reason is extremely difficult.
224. See supranotes 111-15 and accompanying text.
225. Interestingly, a pre-amendment study of ADA claims (covering the years 2000-05) did not
find a high incidence of failure to accommodate claims filed by cancer survivors as compared to
those with other disabilities. Feuerstein et al., supra note 176, at 188. This result seems anomalous
given the importance of accommodation to the maintenance of employment revealed by numerous
studies. The authors hypothesized that uncertainty about the need and availability of
accommodations might explain the lower rate of claims. Id. at 189-90. It may also reflect the fact
that some desired accommodations would not give rise to a viable legal claim, such as emotional
support from the employer and fellow employees. See Yu et al., supra note 98, at 215 (finding two
of the most common reported negative employment experiences of cancer survivors were lack of
support by employer and coworkers).
226. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
227. Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues:
Reassignment and Leave ofAbsence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 441-42 (2002).
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accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Accommodations are assessed on an individualized basis. What may
be reasonable in one employment situation may not be in another. The
regulations recommend an interactive process between employers and
employees to determine whether an accommodation is possible, and the
courts have affirmed the importance of the interactive process.22 9 In
determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, the first question
is whether it is reasonable on its face or in most employment settings.230
If the employee makes that showing, the second question is whether the
employer can show that the accommodation would cause undue hardship
in the particular situation at issue.23'
Because of the individualized nature of the accommodation inquiry
and the inclusive nature of the accommodation definition, there is
always a possibility that an individual with cancer can be
accommodated. To assess the effectiveness of the law for cancer
survivors generally, however, it is useful to look at how the EEOC and
the courts have interpreted the law with respect to the accommodations
deemed most important by survivors.
a.

Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation

Research clearly shows that some cancers create long-term
employment effects. Some survivors are still unable to work or unable to
work full-time twelve to eighteen months after diagnosis.23 2 An
employer's willingness to provide continued flexibility for the employee
with cancer is a key accommodation enabling retention of employment,
which may require time off or reduced hours for some employees.
Accordingly, leave will often be important in enabling survivors to
remain employed.23 3 As discussed above, the FMLA requires up to
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
229. See Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 589, 620 (W.D. Pa. 2014); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3) (2014); FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 4.08

(2009), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/PattemJurynstr/7th civ-instruc_2009.pdf
(stating that both parties must cooperate in interactive process).
230. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,401-02 (2002).
231. Id. at 402. Undue hardship is "significant difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
232. See supra notes 56-57, 60-61, 72, 81, 93-95 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding employer did
not violate Rehabilitation Act by failing to extend six month leave for professor when she was
unable to retum from leave after cancer treatment as her inability to work meant she was not able to
perform the essential functions of the job); Complaint, EEOC v. Children's Hosp. & Research Ctr.,
No. 4:13-CV-05715 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2013) (alleging that employee with breast cancer given six
month leave and terminated when she requested an additional two month leave); Complaint,
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twelve weeks unpaid leave in a twelve-month period, including
intermittent leave, which provides some accommodation for cancer
survivors that meet its eligibility requirements.234 The ADA can
supplement FMLA leave.23 5 For employees in smaller workplaces, with
less than fifty but at least fifteen employees, or employees who do not
yet qualify for FMLA leave, the ADA can substitute.
An important limitation on ADA leave, however, is that, unlike the
FMLA, the statute does not expressly require continuation of health
insurance during leave.236 If the employer continues insurance for
employees on other leaves, however, employees with disabilities cannot
be treated differently.23 7
i.

PaidLeave

Paid sick leave is easily dispatched. It is not a required
accommodation under the ADA. However, the EEOC's Enforcement
Guidance, issued to advise employers and individuals about rights and
responsibilities under the law, does indicate that an employer may be
required to modify its existing paid leave policies to allow an employee
to use paid leave to accommodate a disability. 238 Nor does the FMLA
require paid leave unless it is otherwise available under the employer's
policies.23 9 Thus, paid leave is in the discretion of the employer unless
required by state or local law. 240 About sixty-seven percent of workers
Rozenfeld v. Neurological Assocs. of Long Island, P.C., No. 2:13-CV-04509 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,
2013) (alleging employer failed to accommodate plaintiff by providing six month leave for
treatment of brain cancer, instead deeming plaintiff permanently disabled under employment
contract and terminating her); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Southlake Comm. Mental Health Ctr., Inc.,
No. 2:10-CV-00444 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 2013) (settling case of employee fired for absenteeism after
requesting leave for breast cancer treatment).
234. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
235. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (2014) (indicating that leave is a reasonable accommodation
absent undue hardship).
236. Ivelisse Bonilla, Cancer as a Disability After the American with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act, 59 FED. LAW. 12, 1 (2012).
237. Id.
238. U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITIES COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 24
(2002) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (citing Dutton v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
868 F. Supp. 1260, 1264-65 (D. Kan. 1994)), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/accommodation.html (finding discrimination where employer refused to allow employee to use
paid vacation leave to accommodate disability although employee could not meet requirement of

advance notice for scheduling vacation).
239. See supranote 142 and accompanying text.
240. For a summary of current legislation, see NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, PAID SICK
DAYS STATUTES (2015), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-
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currently have some paid sick leave, while only thirty-seven percent
have some form of short term disability benefits.241 Although a few
states and localities require some employers to provide paid sick leave,
most require only five days and some even fewer.242 This is far less than
almost all cancer patients would need to cover the absences required.
Additionally, many statutes limit coverage. For example, Connecticut's
law covers only some hourly service workers, excluding manufacturing
employees, those working for employers with less than fifty employees,
salaried workers, temporary workers, and others.243 In addition to the
paid leave laws, a few states have public disability insurance programs
similar to unemployment insurance that apply to many employers and
244
provide partial pay for disability from a state-administered fund.
There is increasing pressure for paid sick leave for many purposes,
however, and state and local legislative campaigns exist in many
locations.245 Each additional law requiring paid leave improves cancer
survivors' ability to maintain employment. Unpaid leave is a different
story.
ii.

UnpaidLeave

The EEOC has been active on the issue of leaves of absence as
reasonable accommodations in recent years, and in 2011 it held a public
meeting to evaluate the topic. At that meeting, EEOC commissioners
confirmed that leave as an accommodation must be considered on a
case-by-case basis, but also indicated that additional guidance would be
forthcoming to help employers and employees better deal with this
particularly difficult issue.246
family/psd/paid-sick-days-statutes.pdf.
241. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 3 PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES 3 (2011), available at

http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/archive/program-perspectives-on-sick-leave-and-disability-benefitcombinations-pdf.pdf.
242. See NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supranote 240.

243. Id. The recently enacted Massachusetts law has broader coverage, requiring employers with
eleven or more employees to provide up to forty hours of paid sick leave with smaller employers
required to provide equivalent unpaid leave. Id.
244. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 8-1,
at
http://www.unemploymentinsurance.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2014/
available
disability.pdf. These programs are discussed further infra notes 410-13 and accompanying text.

245. For a summary of current and pending legislation requiring paid sick time at the state and
local level, see NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, STATE AND LOCAL ACTION ON PAID SICK
DAYS (2015), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/campaigns/psd/state-

and-local-action-paid-sick-days.pdf.
246. Peter J. Petesch, EEOC Moves Toward Guidance Addressing Leave as a Reasonable
Accommodation Under the ADA, BNA INSIGHTS: LAB. & EMP. L. (June 6,2011). Such guidance has
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The commissioners noted that some employer "best practices" were
likely to be encouraged in future policy guidance. For example, they
concluded that finite leave of absence policies, without built-in
flexibility, were problematic.247 While extended leave allowances need
not be expressly provided in the policy, some indication of a procedure
to deal with extenuating circumstances would be helpful to avoid
employee confusion. Even if a policy provides a substantial leave period,
it will likely be insufficient if it does not provide for individualized
exceptions. Additionally, communication between employers and
employees on leave is crucial, as the employer has a duty to engage in an
interactive accommodation process. Future EEOC actions may indeed
focus on employers who provide leave initially, but terminate the
accommodations too early in the process, before they have exhausted all
avenues of communication.24 8
Recent EEOC cases have targeted inflexible leave policies, reflecting
the current agency view that exceptions must be made in some
situations. 249 In 2011, the EEOC received its largest ADA-related
settlement ever from Verizon Communications. The company paid
twenty million dollars to resolve a lawsuit alleging that its "no fault"
leave policy failed to take into account the need for leave as a reasonable
accommodation.2 5 ° Similarly, the EEOC settled a suit with the Denny's
not been forthcoming as of yet, however. Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Officials, Attorneys Discuss
Priorities Under Agency's Strategic Enforcement Plan, 42 EMP. Disc. REP. (BNA) 125 (Jan. 16,
2014).
247. Petesch, supranote 246.

248. Id.
249. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-cv-05291, 2013 WL 140604, at *1
(N.D. 111. Jan. 11, 2013), appeal denied 2013 WL 2628795 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013); EEOC v.

United Rd. Towing, Inc., No. 10-CV-06259, 2012 WL 1830099, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012);
EEOC v. Princeton HealthCare Sys., No. 10-4126, 2012 WL 1623870, at *1 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012);
EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-05637, 2010 WL 5071196, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2010).
Each of the cases was resolved by consent decree except the United ParcelService case, which

continues in litigation. See Consent Decree, EEOC v. United Rd. Towing, No. 10-CV-06259, 2012
WL 1830099 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2012); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Princeton HealthCare Sys., No.
3:10-cv-04126-PGS-DEA (D.N.J. June 25, 2014); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Supervalu Inc., No.
1:09-CV-05637, (N.D. fI1. Jan. 14, 2011). On July 15, 2014, a magistrate recommended that the

district court grant the EEOC's motion for civil contempt sanctions against Supervalu for violation
of the consent decree. EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-05637, 2014 WL 6787073, at *21. But

see Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1161-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting employee's
argument that an inflexible six-month sick leave policy violated the Rehabilitation Act and finding
that a refusal to provide additional leave to recover from cancer did not violate the law, although
employer offered yearlong sabbaticals for some employees).
250. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Verizon to Pay $20 Million to Settle
Nationwide EEOC Disability Suit
eeoc/newsroom/release/7-6-1 la.cfin.

(July

6,

2011),

available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/
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restaurant chain, alleging that the employer maintained a maximum
medical leave policy that automatically denied all leave beyond a predetermined limit, even if additional leave was required by the ADA. 25 '
In 2014, however, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that an
inflexible leave policy was inherently discriminatory.25 2
In general, courts have followed the EEOC guidance and the ADA's
legislative history and recognized leave as an appropriate form of
accommodation.25 3 However, differences arise over the amount of leave
that is considered reasonable. Most courts have held that employers do
not have to accommodate workers who require an indefinite period of
leave.254 For example, the Eighth Circuit has held that "a request for an
indefinite leave of absence.. . is not a reasonable accommodation under
the ADA., 255 In that case, the court concluded that an employee with
ovarian cancer could not be considered "otherwise qualified" under the
ADA because she could not perform her duties as a store manager while
of appeals have
on leave to undergo chemotherapy.256 Federal courts
25 8 Fifth,259 Sixth,2 6 1
25 7
Fourth,
First,
the
in
conclusions
similar
reached
251. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Denny's to Pay $1.3 Million to
Lawsuit (June 27, 2011), available at
Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-27-1 lb.cfm. For additional settlements, see Written
Testimony of John Hendrickson, Regional Attorney, EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
2011), available at http://wwwl .eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8(June 8,
COMMISSION
11/hendrickson.cfin.
252. Hwang, 753 F.3d at 1164 (suggesting that inflexible policies can benefit individuals with
disabilities by their transparency, clarity, and consistency).
253. Befort, supranote 227, at 459-60.
254. The EEOC's 2008 Guidance also reflects this view. See The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Applying Performanceand Conduct Standards to Employees with Disabilities, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html (last
updated Jan. 20, 2011).
255. Peyton v. Fred's Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2009).
256. Id.
257. See Fiumara v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 327 F. App'x 212, 213 (2009)
("Similarly, indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.").
258. See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the ADA contains "no
reference to an individual's fiture ability to perform the essential functions of his position").
259. See Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that an ability to
appear for work is an essential aspect of any job); Harville v. Tex. A&M Univ., 833 F. Supp. 2d
645, 661 (S.D. Tex. 2011) ("Where attendance is an essential aspect of the job, an individual who
has frequent absences is unqualified.").
260. See Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling
against an employee with a shoulder injury who failed to state when she would return to work and
was terminated after a year's leave). But see Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d
775, 783 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a genuine issue of fact as to whether an eight-week leave of
absence followed by a request for an additional one-month leave was a reasonable accommodation).
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Seventh,26 1 Tenth,262 and Eleventh263 Circuits. A leave of absence with
an anticipated date of return that cannot be predicted with medical
certainty, however, is not a request for indefinite leave. 2 4
Therefore, some of these circuits have agreed with EEOC
recommendations that it is reasonable for employers to grant successive
requests or requests for a definite period of extended leave, as long as
the accommodation does not unduly burden the employer. In 2000, the
First Circuit concluded that an employer would suffer no hardship if it
granted extra leave to a secretary with cancer who had already had
considerable absences, since her temporary replacements were able to
perform her duties with no loss to efficiency. 265 Likewise, in Cehrs v.
Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center,266 the Sixth Circuit found
a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether an additional request for
one month off following an initial eight-week leave of absence was
reasonable.26 7 The Cehrs court criticized the "presumption that
uninterrupted

attendance

is

an

essential job

requirement.

2 68

If

attendance is treated as an essential requirement, the employer would
261. See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
dockworker's request for unlimited sick days to accommodate Kaposi's sarcoma was not a
reasonable accommodation, and due to his record of frequent absences, he could not be considered
"qualified").
262. See Lara v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 121 F. App'x 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding
that employee was not entitled to three months additional leave or to substitute accrued vacation
time for disability leave, because there was no reliable evidence of the expected duration of the
impairment); Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1128-30 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding an employee
whose doctor did not indicate the duration of her impairment was not entitled to leave as a
reasonable accommodation); Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding extended leave after one year not reasonable where a delivery driver had told the company
that he would never be able to return to work as a driver and could not say when he would be able to
work at all); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding
leave was not a reasonable accommodation where there was no evidence of the duration of the
impairment other than that it would not be permanent).
263. Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
264. See Written Testimony of Brian East Senior Attorney Texas DisabilityRights, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 9 (June 8, 2011) [hereinafter Testimony of Brian East], available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-1 1/east.cfrn (citing cases).
265. Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 649 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Reed
v. Jefferson Parrish Sch. Bd., No. 12-2758, 2014 WL 2589152 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (finding
plaintiff who sought an additional two weeks of leave after a six-month leave of absence was
qualified and there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the additional leave would cause undue
hardship for the employer).
266. 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998).
267. Id. at 783. But see Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting case law among several circuits to suggest that a request for medical leave in excess of
eighteen months would likely be unreasonable).
268. 155 F.3d at 782.
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have no burden to show that a leave would cause undue hardship.2 69
Further, the individualized inquiry that the ADA requires in disability
discrimination cases would be eliminated.27 °
Whether an extended leave of absence poses an undue burden on the
employer depends on many different factors, including the resources of
the particular employer, and the cost or difficulty involved in providing a
particular accommodation.271 While the First Circuit has found that over
a year of leave could be considered reasonable,272 the Eighth Circuit,
under a different set of circumstances, found that a leave of six months
would be unduly burdensome.273 In Epps v. City of Pine Lawn,274 the
court held that a small municipal government could not feasibly
reallocate a police officer's duties among a small staff over a six-month
period.2 75
Courts also take varying views as to whether an employer needs to
accommodate periods of intermittent leave resulting from chronic
illness. Several circuits have dealt with the issue by determining whether
regular attendance is an essential job function-and in some cases have
found it to be.276 The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has held that attendance
is essential for any job.277 Where attendance is essential to the job, courts
have concluded that a person whose disability causes poor attendance is
not "otherwise qualified. ' 278 As discussed infra with respect to
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2012).
272. Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 (1stCit. 2000).
273. Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 2003).
274. 353 F.3d 588 (8th Cit. 2003).
275. Id. at 592 n.5.
276. Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996); Tyndall v. Nat'l
Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cit. 1994) (stating that reliable attendance is "a necessary
element of most jobs").
277. Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 ("[A]n essential element of any ... job is an ability to appear for
work... and to complete assigned tasks within a reasonable period of time." (alteration in original)
(quoting Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cit. 1994))). But see Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
604 F.3d 848, 860 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that an employee's irregular attendance did not render
him unqualified where the employer's attendance policy was extremely lenient and the employee
had remained compliant with the policy for seven years, despite his irregular attendance).
278. Grubb v. Sw. Airlines, 296 F. App'x 383, 388 (5th Cit. 2008) ("Lack of physical presence is
a commonly-accepted disqualification for ADA protection."); see also Col6n-FontAnez v.
Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 33-34 (1st Cit. 2011) (finding that an employee suffering
from fibromyalgia was not qualified because she was absent at least twenty percent of her scheduled
work time for ten years); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-79 (11th Cir. 1994)
(finding housekeeping aide with rheumatoid arthritis was not qualified because he had unpredictable
sporadic absences and consistent attendance was required by the job).
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modifications of work schedules, 279 assessing this issue under the rubric
of whether the individual is qualified is problematic. As the court in
Cehrs noted, this relieves the employer of the obligation to show that
280
leave to recover from illness or its effects causes any hardship.
Further, attendance is not a job function at all, as defined by the
regulations.28 1 Certainly, erratic or simply poor attendance can be
problematic for an employer in many cases, but analyzing the issue
under the undue hardship prong allows for consideration of the particular
job, the needs of the employer, and the circumstances of the employee in
assessing whether leave is a required accommodation under the law.
In accord with this approach, courts in other circuits have analyzed all
the relevant circumstances to determine whether a series of repeated
absences disqualifies an employee from performing essential job
functions. 282 In Brannon v. Luco Mop Co.,283 the Eighth Circuit
considered several factors to conclude that a diabetic employee with toe
and foot amputations was not qualified.284 She was absent forty of
seventy-seven work days prior to termination, postponed return dates
three times, and failed to demonstrate that having additional time off to
recuperate would enable her to have more consistent attendance. 285 In
Carlson v. InaCom Corp., 286 the court held that an employee was
qualified, despite her absences, when the employer presented no
evidence to establish that the absences resulted in essential business not
being completed in a timely and efficient manner.287
Current law seems fairly clear that definite leave of a limited duration
should be considered as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA,
279. See infra notes 330-38 and accompanying text.
280. See supranote 269 and accompanying text.
281. See Testimony of Brian East, supra note 264 (citing, inter alia, EEOC regulations defining
job functions).
282. See Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 n.ll (9th Cir. 2001) (noting
that regular attendance is not per se an essential job function); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[tihe presumption that uninterrupted
attendance is an essential job requirement improperly dispenses with the burden-shifting analysis"
for determining ADA violations); Cook v. R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10
F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Unless absenteeism rises to a level such that the applicant is no longer
'otherwise qualified,' the Rehabilitation Act requires employers to bear absenteeism and other
miscellaneous burdens involved in making reasonable accommodations in order to permit the
employment of disabled persons.").
283. 521 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2008).
284. Id. at 848-49.
285. Id.
286. 885 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Neb. 1995).
287. Id. at 1321.
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while indefinite leave in most cases is not required. In some cases,
however, courts have found regular attendance to be an essential job
function, which limits even the accommodation of a finite leave.288 More
difficult questions are presented in cases where the type of leave
requested falls somewhere in between--extended periods of leave,
successive leave requests, and multiple brief absences. These are factspecific determinations that often turn on issues such as whether the job
requires a physical presence, the length of the leave, or how much of a
burden the employee's absence places on the employer. In some cases
they will depend on whether the court presumes that attendance is an
essential function or considers whether accommodating the particular
absences causes undue hardship. Telecommuting and multiple brief
absences will be explored further in the job flexibility section below.
b.

Job Flexibility as an Accommodation

The literature on cancer and work indicates that flexibility in work is
an important accommodation in enabling continued employment.
Several possible accommodations might provide such flexibility,
including reassigning some tasks to other employees, providing
equipment to assist in physical tasks, rest breaks or altered schedules for
survivors suffering from fatigue, and working from home. Data on
workplace flexibility, however, reveal that less than half of workers have
flexible hours and less than forty percent have flexibility in work
days. 289 Sarah's job difficulties suggest that a more flexible approach
might provide needed accommodations that enable her to keep her job.
The ability to change shifts for her treatment is one such
accommodation. If her performance is in fact deficient, perhaps it is due
to the effects of treatment, and rest breaks or assistive equipment might
help. Each of these accommodations has been addressed by the EEOC
and the courts.
ProvidingAssistive Equipment

i.
An

example

from

a recent

case

illustrates

the

need

for

288. See, e.g., Basden v. Prof'l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding
attendance to be an essential function and rejecting claim of employee with multiple sclerosis who
was fired despite her request for a thirty-day leave where the court did not believe the employee
established that the leave would have enabled her to return to work on a regular and predictable
basis).
289. Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 5. As in the case of paid leaves, Latinos and AfricanAmericans are less likely to have these benefits than other workers. Id.
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accommodations for physical limitations. 290 A support services assistant
at a law firm had lifting restrictions resulting from cancer treatment.291
The job required moving heavy boxes of documents and occasionally
moving machines on wheels.292 The complaint alleged that the employer
initially allowed the assistant to use a cart to move heavy boxes and to
break down boxes of documents to reduce the amount of weight lifted,
firing the
but then refused to continue the accommodation, ultimately
2 93
assistant because of her inability to lift heavy weights.
First, it appears that lifting these documents was an essential function
of the job. To be a qualified individual with a disability, the cancer
survivor must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with
or without reasonable accommodation. Elimination of essential functions
is not a reasonable accommodation although reassignment of marginal
functions can be.294 Even if an employee's inability to perform essential
functions is temporary, reassignment of those functions is not required
as an accommodation. At most, the employee might be entitled to a
reasonable leave pending recovery sufficient to enable performance of
all job functions. The complaint did not allege that the employer should
have reassigned these functions, but instead argued that the
accommodation initially offered was reasonable and enabled her to
perform the job.295
The assistant requested to be allowed to continue using the equipment
that enabled her to do the job despite the lifting limitations from the
cancer. The question is whether this accommodation is reasonable,
whether it enables her to meet the requirements of her job, and whether
it causes undue hardship to the employer.296 It is certainly possible, if not
290. For another example, see Complaint, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:1 0-CV-00222
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2010) (involving employee with lifting restrictions resulting from cancer who
was placed on unpaid leave when he could not fill in for another employee who was on break
because the position required lifting). The case was settled by consent decree in December, 2011.
Consent Decree, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 2:10-CV-00222 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2011).
291. See Complaint 8(f), EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, No. 1:13-CV-00046,
2014 BL 178305 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 16,2013).
292. The employer claimed that the job required lifting of up to seventy-five pounds and pushing
or pulling machines on wheels weighing up to 700 pounds. Id. 8(h).
293. Id. 8(i)-(1).
294. See, e.g., Bell v. Hercules Liftboat Co., 524 F. App'x 64, 69 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting
summary judgment to employer on termination claim of cancer survivor who admitted she could not
perform eighty percent of her job functions and was only able to return to work because her
subordinates performed her job functions).
295. Complaint, supra note 291, 8(i).
296. There is disagreement among scholars about whether reasonableness and undue hardship are
merely different recitations of the same obligation or separate requirements and, if the latter, what is
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likely, that using the cart and breaking down boxes of documents into
smaller sections slows the assistant in her work. If so, the question
would be whether it was sufficiently significant to make the
accommodation unreasonable or to constitute undue hardship in light of
the size and financial resources of the employer and the impact on
operations, expenses, and other employees.297 In thinking about whether
the law strikes the appropriate balance, we might ask whether it properly
considers and balances efficiency and equity or fairness to employees.298
By requiring reasonable accommodation unless the employer shows
undue hardship, the law requires the employer to bear some cost. Only
when that cost is unreasonable or undue does the employee lose.
Another way to look at the question is how the ADA fits with other
laws and supports for cancer survivors, and where the cost should fall.
Should we expect the assistant to find another job consistent with her
limitations if possible? If there is no such job available to her, should
society support the assistant in some way? Or is it better for society if
the employer suffers some loss of efficiency, presumably either passed
on to its clients in higher costs, its other employees in reduced wages
and benefits, or its partners in reduced profits, to enable the assistant to
continue working?
Ultimately, the EEOC's claim on behalf of the assistant was defeated
on summary judgment, not because the accommodation discussed above
was unreasonable but because it did not enable her to do all of the
essential functions of her job. 299 The accommodation allowed the
assistant to do some of her job functions but did not allow her to work at
several other locations or on Saturdays where assistance was unavailable
and the objects that needed lifting could not be broken down into smaller
the distinction between the two. Compare Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 545-46 (2013) (arguing that the two are
different requirements and that an accommodation is unreasonable if it alters the fundamental
employer-employee relationship even if it does not cause the employer undue hardship), with Mark
C. Weber, UnreasonableAccommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1119, 1124 (2010)
(arguing that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are "two sides of the same coin").
Existing case law does not resolve the question. Porter, supra, at 543-53.
297. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2012); see also Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 WL
604169, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) ("Providing more detailed instruction seems tailored to
address Mr. Kravits's shortcomings in preparing job vacancy notices and completing other projects.
While providing this written instruction would surely require an additional expenditure of time and
resources, it is not clear that the costs would outweigh the benefits or that it would impose an undue
hardship on the Department.").
298. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 112-13.
299. EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, No. 1: 13-CV-00046, 2014 WL 2916851,
at *7-8 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2014).
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the assistant will have to find

another position consistent with her limitations.
In general, courts seem more receptive to accommodations requiring

assistive equipment or devices to accommodate physical limitations than
to accommodations that require changes in established working
conditions like schedules.30 1 Courts denying employer motions have
recognized that providing seating,30 2 an air-conditioned vehicle,30 3 a
special ergonomic keyboard,0 4 voice recognition software,0 5 and even a
human aide 30 6 might be reasonable under some circumstances. While for
some jobs there will be no assistance sufficient to enable cancer
survivors to do the job, in other cases, an accommodation may allow a
survivor with physical limitations, mental effects of treatment, or fatigue

to continue to work.

300. See Ben James, EEOC Wants 4th Circ. to Revive Womble CarlyleADA Suit, LAw360 (Sept.
11, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/576344.
301. Porter, supra note 189, at 44, 57.
302. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568-69 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing
summary judgment for Wal-Mart finding jury question as to whether applicant with cerebral palsy
could perform the essential functions of greeter and cashier positions with seating aids such as
scooter or stool); George v. Roush & Yates Racing Engines, LLC, No. 5:11-CV-00025-RLV, 2012
WL 3542633, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss where employee alleged
he was able to perform the essential functions of his job while working from couches and rolling
about the building on an office chair and was nevertheless terminated); Seim v. Three Eagles
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 09-CV-3071-DEO, 2011 WL 2149061, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 1, 2011)
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether employer failed to accommodate on air
personality by providing a chair); cf Glow v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1147
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding offer to purchase ergonomic chair for employee with neck and back pain
was a reasonable accommodation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
303. See Gooden v. Consumers Energy Co., No. 12-11954, 2013 WL 4805061, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 9, 2013) (denying summary judgment, finding genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether providing an air-conditioned vehicle to a diabetic employee would be a reasonable
accommodation).
304. See Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 WL 604169, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012)
(denying summary judgment to employer because employee established genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether employer refused to reasonably accommodate by providing ergonomic
keyboard and step-by-step instructions).
305. See Dentice v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 10-CV-00113, 2012 WL 2504046, at * 19 (E.D. Wis.
June 28, 2012) (denying summary judgment for employer on employee's claim that employer failed
to accommodate by providing voice activated software); Garza v. Abbott Labs., 940 F. Supp. 1227,
1243 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same).
306. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying
summary judgment where teacher claimed providing her with an aide would enable her to perform
all the essential functions of her job).
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Requests to Work from Home

Another aspect of job flexibility is working from home. This may not
be a reasonable accommodation for most hospital employees like Sarah,
who are often providing direct service to patients,3 °7 but would be
effective for many employees whose work is primarily or exclusively
computer-based. °8
Until recently, few courts had found working from home to be a
reasonable accommodation. In Rauen v. U.S. Tobacco,30 9 the Seventh
Circuit held that a software engineer's request for a home office while
undergoing treatment for rectal and breast cancer was not reasonable.3 10
The court stated that "working at home is rarely a reasonable
accommodation.., because most jobs require the kind of teamwork,
supervision that simply cannot be had in a
personal interaction, and
311
home office situation.",
The Seventh Circuit has not foreclosed any possibility of working
from home as a reasonable accommodation, however. In Waggoner v.
Olin Corp.,312 though the court held that an employee's work from home
request was unreasonable, it acknowledged that such an option might be
reasonable in circumstances where physical attendance is not an
essential function.3 13 In those cases, the relevant issue becomes whether
there is an undue hardship on the employer.314 The Seventh Circuit thus
appears to be focusing on attendance as an essential job function.
The EEOC lists several factors that should be considered in
307. See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2012).
But see Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that
working at home might be a reasonable accommodation for a medical transcriptionist).
308. For case examples involving cancer, see Eberle v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, No. !:14-CV01687 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014) (alleging that employee was denied accommodation of working at
home and then terminated because of his cancer and the side effects of his treatment, which
included drowsiness), and Complaint 11-22, Gregorev v. City of New York, No. 1:14-cv-00909
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2014) (alleging new supervisor unlawfully terminated work at home
accommodation for plaintiff with multiple myeloma whose immune system might be compromised
by workplace contact).
309. 319 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2003).
310. Id. at 897.
311. Id. at 896; see also Mason v. Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a service coordinator's physical attendance at work was essential because the position
required supervision and teamwork); Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir.
1998) (finding that a bank loan officer was required to work as part of a team, and all members of
the team needed to be present in the office).
312. 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
313. Id. at 485.
314. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238.
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determining the feasibility of allowing an employee to work from home.
These include the employer's ability to adequately supervise the
employee, whether work requires specific tools or equipment that cannot
be easily replicated at home, or whether the employee requires access to
documents and information located only in the workplace. 315 The quality
of work an employee produces at home may also be a factor.3 16
More recently, some courts have begun to acknowledge that
technology has made working at home a more feasible
accommodation.3 17 Not all courts have been as open to working at home,
however, despite the availability of technology that enables instant
communication and virtual meetings. Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in an
en banc decision in EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.,31 8 recognized that
telecommuting might be reasonable for some jobs, but adopted the view
that on-site attendance is an essential function for jobs requiring
interaction with others. 31 9 As the dissent pointed out, this ignores the
availability of technology that allows virtual interaction and defers
unnecessarily to the employer's existing practices without carefully
examining the particular facts.32 °
315. See Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/telew-ork.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2005).

316. See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that a sales
representative was not entitled to accommodation of working at home but suggesting that such an
accommodation would be reasonable in those rare cases where the employee could work at home
without a diminution in the quality of the employee's work).
317. See, e.g., Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("Technological advances and
the evolving nature of the workplace, moreover, have contributed to the facilitative options
available to employers (although their reasonableness in any given case still must be proven).");
Core v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, No. 3:11-CV-00166, 2012 WL 3073418, at *11
(S.D. Ohio July 30, 2012) (stating that in contrast to earlier cases suggesting that working at home
would rarely be a reasonable accommodation, in light of changes in technology it would not be
unusual to find such an accommodation reasonable today); Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
No. 10-CV-00405, 2012 WL 832889, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012) (stating that earlier cases
suggesting that working at home would rarely be a reasonable accommodation were decided before
the internet and technology facilitated remote access to the workplace and other employees);
Meachetm v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., No. 2:14-CV-02156-JTF, 2015 WL 4866397
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2015) (denying employer summary judgment because of factual issues
regarding whether physical presence at the job site was essential or whether attorney could perform
essential functions of the job through telecommuting and whether permitting her to work at home
would cause the employer undue hardship); Jury Verdict Form, Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div., No. 2:14-CV-02156-JTF (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff was
qualified and the employer refused to provide a reasonable accommodation).
318. 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
319. Id. at 762-63.
320. Id. at 776-77 (Moore, J., dissenting). The en banc court vacated a panel decision that found
that while attendance might be an essential function, it need not be at the employer's location if the
job could be done remotely. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'den
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With continued advances in technology, telecommuting as an
accommodation may be more available to cancer survivors in the future.
But despite technological changes, courts such as the Sixth Circuit in
Ford Motor Co. remain reluctant to require employers to accommodate
by changing existing practices requiring actual physical attendance.32 ' In
addition, many jobs still require workplace presence.322 Recent data from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that flexibility in work location is
not widely available to employees and even less available for Latino and
African-American workers.323 In particular, lower wage jobs often
require a physical presence in the workplace for either manual labor or
interaction with customers being served.
iii.

Rest Breaks and Flexible Schedules

Fatigue is a common complication of cancer and its treatment.
Flexibility in job schedules and rest breaks may accommodate cancerrelated fatigue and other treatment effects.324 Flexible schedules may
also allow employees like Sarah to obtain needed medical treatment
without taking leave or losing time from work. Additionally, rest breaks
or altered schedules may enable a survivor to work a physically or
mentally taxing job.
A few states have laws mandating rest breaks 325 and more require
meal periods for longer work hours, but many states have no such
banc, 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015). The panel refused to find that the fact that the job required
teamwork automatically precluded telecommuting. Id. at 644-45.
321. Cf McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting "[p]hysical
presence at or by a specific time is not, as a matter of law, an essential function of all employment"
and pointing out that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case).
322. See, e.g., Morris v. Jackson, 994 F. Supp. 2d 38, 48 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding working at home
would create undue hardship where staff, vendors, and contractors would have to come to the
employee's home and change clothes and wash before entering to avoid triggering employee's
allergies).
323. Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 5.
324. For case examples involving cancer, see EEOC v. Angel Medical Center, Inc., No. 2:13-CV00034, 2013 BL 338567 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2014) (alleging that employer failed to accommodate
by either setting a schedule that would allow employee to work full-time while undergoing
treatment or transferring her to another department, and then terminated her for failing to work fulltime), and Consent Decree, EEOC v. Journal Disposition Corp., No. 1:I0-CV-00886-RHB (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 10, 2011) (settling case alleging that employer fired employee after exceeding leave
authorized under employer's policy despite employee's request for accommodation of part-time
work).
325. See Minimum Paid Rest Period Requirements Under State Law for Adult Employees in
Private Sector, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/rest.htm
(showing California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington all have state mandated rest breaks).
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requirements and those that do often have exceptions.32 6 Where no
express legal requirements exist, work breaks and schedules are set by
the employer. The EEOC Guidance on interpreting the ADA indicates
that modified schedules, including rest breaks, are a reasonable
accommodation absent undue hardship. 327 Case law also indicates that
rest breaks may be a reasonable accommodation to allow an employee to
do a physically demanding job.328 Rest breaks, like allowing use of
equipment that reduces productivity, come with a cost. As in the case of
the support services assistant discussed above, the question is who
should bear those costs. Because the statute requires reasonable
accommodation, it seems that some rest breaks would be reasonable for
most employers unless the job was a unique one that did not allow either
interruption or substitution of workers for breaks. For a court that
viewed meeting a particular schedule as an essential requirement of the
job simply because it was mandated by the employer, however, an
employee requiring rest breaks might be found unqualified. An
important determinant in these cases will be how much deference courts
will give to the employer's representation as to essential functions of the
job.
Modified work schedules are specifically mentioned in the statute as a
required accommodation. 9 Medication, fatigue, or treatment schedules
may require a schedule modification to enable cancer survivors to work.
This might include starting later, ending earlier, changing work days or
times, or reducing hours, for example.
As several scholars have noted, some courts have been reluctant to
require employers to change existing workplace structures such as
326. See Minimum Length of Meal PeriodRequired Under State Law for Adult Employees in
Private Sector, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/meal.htm

(showing that California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Guam, and Puerto Rico all require
meal periods for longer working hours). All states except New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Vermont

have established exceptions to their meal period requirements. For example, West Virginia exempts
any employee who is permitted to eat lunch while working, Colorado excludes certain occupations
such as teacher, nurse, or other medical professional, and Kentucky, like many states, excludes
employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
327. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supranote 238, T 22-23.
328. See Morton v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 1:12-CV-00028, 2013 WL 3088815, at *4-5

(N.D. Miss. June 18, 2013) (denying summary judgment for employer based on factual dispute
where employee with prosthetic leg claimed he could complete twelve hour shift with two ten to
fifteen minute rest breaks and a thirty minute lunch although he never completed a full shift without
assistance prior to termination).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012). Not surprisingly, the regulations also discuss modified work

schedules. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2014).
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schedules to accommodate individuals with disabilities. 330 A court may
accomplish this result by characterizing attendance or compliance with a
particular work schedule as an essential function of the job, thereby
rendering the employee unqualified.33 ' Professor Travis has identified
cases where courts upheld refusals to accommodate by reducing
overtime requirements, 332 allowing an employee to work part-time rather
than full-time,3 33 modifying start time and allowing the employee to
make up delayed starts at the end of the shift,334 and modifying a strict
attendance policy to accommodate absences caused by a disability. 335
Professor Porter, writing about post-amendment cases, found a similar
trend among courts unwilling to require employers to change workplace
structures to accommodate disabilities.336 Like Travis, Porter found
cases where courts deemed employees unqualified because they needed
they could not meet
part-time rather than full-time work 337 or because
338
policies.
attendance
rigid
of
the requirements
On the other hand, some courts have recognized that requests for
modification of attendance requirements or schedule changes must be
considered in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular
employment setting, and whether the change would cause undue
hardship for the employer. In Solomon v. Vilsack,339 the court, reversing
the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the employer, found
that a flexible schedule could be a reasonable accommodation where the
government budget analyst asked to arrive late and work late as needed
to accommodate her depression. 340 The plaintiff submitted sufficient
330. Porter, supra note 189, at 57; Michelle Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potentialof
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3,22-27, 32-36 (2005).
331. Travis, supra note 330, at3l-32.
332. Id. at 27 (citing Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000)).
333. Id. at 24-25 (citing Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621 (11 th Cir. 1998)).
334. Id. at 32-33 (citing Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (1 1th Cir. 2000)).
335. Id. at 33-35 (citing EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001);
Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2001)).
336. Porter, supra note 189, at 60.
337. Id. at 61 (citing White v. Standard Ins. Co., 529 F. App'x 547, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2013)).
338. Id. at 61-62 (citing Brown v. Honda of Am., No. 2:10-CV-00459, 2012 WL 4061795, at *46 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 14, 2012)); Lewis v. New York City Police Dep't, 908 F. Supp. 2d 313, 326-27
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 2012), aff'd, 537 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2013); Blackard v. Livingston Parish
Sewer Dist., No. 12-CV-00704-SDD-RLB, 2014 WL 199629 at *3-5 (M.D. La. Jan. 15, 2014); see
also CATHERINE ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY

AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 23-33 (2010) (discussing cases where courts refused to restructure work
norms to accommodate individuals with disabilities).
339. 763 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
340. Id. at 10-11 (citing the ADA's explicit recognition of this accommodation incorporated by
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evidence to overcome summary judgment by showing that she had been
allowed to work a flexible schedule and met all deadlines and, in
addition, another employee in the same job classification also worked a
flexible schedule. 341 The court recognized that while the ability to work
a consistent, predictable schedule might be necessary for some jobs, it is
a factual determination dependent on the particular position.342
Ward v. Health Research Institute 43 offers another example. 344 The
court there found a genuine issue of fact as to whether a data entry clerk
must have a regular rather than a flexible schedule, noting that the
evidence showed only that the data must be entered before the laboratory
opened the next day, not that any particular start and ending times were
necessary or that the plaintiff needed to overlap schedules with other
employees.3 45 Further, as to supervision, there was conflicting evidence
as to whether a supervisor needed to be present during all of the
plaintiffs work hours.346 The court refused to accept as sufficient the
employer's "general statements regarding the snowball effect of such an
accommodation-it would eliminate employers' control over the
workplace and ability to maintain any standards., 347 The court stated that
"[s]uch an argument runs counter to the general principle behind the
ADA that imposes a duty on the employer to modify some work rules,
34
facilities, terms, or conditions to enable a disabled person to work., 1
Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.
Rigid adherence to workplace structures such as particular schedules
or attendance requirements will adversely affect the ability of some
cancer survivors to maintain employment. Such requirements may be
the Rehabilitation Act).
341. Id.
342. For a similar case, see McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2013)
(finding that a predictable schedule is not essential for all jobs and reversing summary judgment for
the employer that argued it could not accommodate employee's unpredictable late arrivals).
343. 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000).
344. Travis, supra note 330, at 71-72; see also Croy v. Blue Ridge Bread, Inc., No. 3:12-CV00034, 2013 WL 3776802 (W.D. Va. July 15, 2013) (denying employer's motion to dismiss where
employee requested reduced work schedule and employer did not identify any undue hardship or
engage in the interactive process designed to reach a reasonable accommodation); Peirano v.
Momentive Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV-00281, 2012 WL 4959429 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17,
2012) (denying employer's summary judgment motion in case where employee was denied a
flexible starting time based on employer's attendance policy and claim that regular and timely
attendance was essential).
345. Ward, 209 F.3d at 35-37.
346. Id. at 37.
347. Id. at 36.
348. Id. at 36-37.
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essential in some jobs. Courts should avoid unquestioning acceptance of
an employer's assertion that compliance with set requirements is
essential, however. Application of a flexible fact-based standard to
determine whether the particular job truly requires maintenance of
existing structures will make the workplace more accommodating for
survivors. Our hypothetical survivor Sarah, for example, has negotiated
shift changes to accommodate her treatment, but suddenly the employer
has become averse to the process. Is there truly a hardship on the
employer that has caused this resistance? If not, such accommodation
should be permitted.
c.

Reassignmentas a ReasonableAccommodation

If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the job
with reasonable accommodation, the law contemplates reassignment to a
vacant position. The EEOC Guidance makes clear that reassignment is
an "accommodation of last resort," to be used only when there is no
available accommodation that will enable the employee to perform the
essential functions of the current job. 349 The position must be vacant,
i.e., no employee must be bumped from a position to make it available to
an employee with a disability. 350 Further, the employee must be qualified
for the vacant position. 351 lf more than one vacant position exists, the
employee should be reassigned to the position closest to the existing job
in terms of pay, benefits, and working conditions.352 The EEOC
Guidance indicates that the employee need not be the most qualified
employee for the position in order to be entitled to reassignment.353
Like the EEOC, the courts have found that reassignment of a qualified
employee to a vacant position is a reasonable accommodation if the
employee can no longer perform the functions of the current position.
The courts have struggled with how to accommodate the reassignment
obligation to other employer policies, however. The Supreme Court
weighed in on this question in U.S. Airways v. Barnett.354 There, the
Court held that it was not reasonable to reassign an employee with a
disability to a vacant position where a unilaterally-imposed employer
349. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, 24.
350. Id.
351. Id. (stating that the employee must be qualified and the employer has no obligation to assist
the employee in meeting the qualifications).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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seniority system would award that job to another employee. 355 Thus, in

any workplace with a seniority system, whether imposed by the
employer or negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement,
reassignment is unavailable unless the limited exception left open by the
court is met.356
The plaintiff might show, for example, that the employer, having
retained the right to change the seniority system unilaterally,
exercises that right fairly frequently, reducing employee
expectations that the system will be followed-to the point
where one more departure, needed to accommodate an
individual with a disability, will not likely make a difference.
The plaintiff might show that the system already contains
exceptions such that, in the circumstances, one further exception
is unlikely to matter. We do not mean these examples to exhaust
the kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make. But we do
mean to say that the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing
special circumstances that make an exception from the seniority
system reasonable in the particular case. 3 7
Although the EEOC Guidance says the employee need not be the
most qualified for the position, courts have struggled with the question
of whether an employer must award a vacant position to an employee
needing accommodation if a more qualified applicant is available. The
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have split.35 Huber v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.359 and Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.360 illustrate
the two positions. The court in Huber concluded that an employer policy
355. Id. at 406.
356. Of course, an employer--or in the case of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer
and a union--could agree to make an exception to the seniority system for the employee needing
accommodation. In the case of a unilateral system, there is little risk to the employer making an
exception barring the unlikely situation where the system is contractually binding. In the case of a
collective bargaining agreement, however, an employer and union might be sued for breach of
contract and breach of the duty of fair representation by an employee who did not receive the
position due to the accommodation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
357. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405-06.
358. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007)
("We... conclude the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and does not require an employer to
reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a reassignment would violate
a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified candidate."
(citations omitted)), with EEOC v. United Airlines, 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that
reassignment to a vacant position would be a reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship and
finding a policy of appointing the most qualified person to the position is not, without more, undue
hardship).
359. 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2008).
360. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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to hire the most qualified individual was analogous to a seniority system
and therefore reassignment would constitute undue hardship.3 61 In Smith,
however, the court found that absent undue hardship, the employer must
reassign an employee who could not perform the current job with
accommodation to an open position for which the employee was
qualified.362 The existence of more qualified candidates for the vacant
position does not relieve the obligation to accommodate by
reassignment.363 The court noted that requiring only that the individual
be allowed to compete with others for the open position on the basis of
qualification would not be an accommodation at all, because the
nondiscrimination provisions of the ADA require equal consideration.3 64
Given that the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in one of the
cases, this split in the courts is unlikely to be resolved soon.365
Other employer policies, such as those limiting transfers and light
duty assignments, might also impede reassignment. Some employers bar
transfers completely, while others deny them to probationary employees
or allow them only within the employee's current department, facility, or
other work unit.366 The EEOC's position is that such policies do not,
without more, properly limit the reassignment obligation.36 7The
employer must make a specific showing of undue hardship in the
361. 486 F.3d at 483.
362. 180 F.3d at 1169 ("If no reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in his or her
existing job, then the reasonable accommodation may require reassignment to a vacant position so
long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not impose an undue burden on the
employer.").
363. Id. ("Anything more, such as requiring the reassigned employee to be the best qualified
employee for the vacant job, is judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory language or its legislative
history.").
364. ld. at 1164-65.
365. United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013). The Seventh Circuit in
United Airlines overruled its earlier decision in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th
Cir. 2000), a case on which the Eighth Circuit relied in Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d at 483. EEOC
v. United Airlines, 693 F.3d 760, 761, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Huber, 552 U.S. 1074 (2007), but dismissed the petition after a settlement. 552 U.S.
1136 (2008). Given these facts, the continued force of Huber and the argument that an employer can
apply a policy of choosing the most qualified applicant to avoid reassigning a qualified individual
with a disability is questionable.
366. See, e.g., United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D. Colo. 1997)
(finding that policy of not transferring police officers to non-police positions did not bar transfer as
accommodation); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(finding that employer that did not transfer employees between facilities need not transfer disabled
24-25 (stating that employer policy of
employee); ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238,
not transferring probationary employees does not justify failure to transfer probationary employee
as an accommodation).
367. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supranote 238, 24-27.
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particular situation and cannot simply rely on policies to establish undue
hardship. Courts have not always agreed with the EEOC position, in
some cases finding that an employer need not modify policies to allow
reassignment of disabled employees.368
As for light duty accommodations, courts have approved employer
policies reserving light duty jobs for individuals with temporary
disabilities, refusing to require employers to assign individuals with
disabilities to such jobs on a permanent basis. 369 Where an employer has
provided light duty in some situations, however, courts have found it to
be a reasonable accommodation.37 ° Some courts have also found that
where an employer has a policy of rotating employees through jobs, the
duty
employer need not provide a permanent assignment to a light
37
position for an employee who cannot do all the jobs in a rotation. '
While in some cases these policies limiting light duty and transfers
may be essential, as in the case of other accommodations requiring
structural changes in the workplace, some courts seem to accept without
serious scrutiny the employer's representation that they are necessary.3 72
Requiring an employer to prove that making an exception to such a
policy would cause undue hardship would make it easier for cancer
survivors to retain employment.37 3
368. See, e.g., Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 398 (finding that employer that did not transfer employees
between facilities need not transfer disabled employee).
369. See, e.g., Josey v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 0:11 -CA-02993-CMC-SVEH, 2013 WL
5566035, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 2013), aff'dper curium, 566 F. App'x 209 (4th Cir. 2014); Watson v.
Lithonia Lighting, 304 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir.
1999).
370. See, e.g., Gibson v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 12-CV-00657, 2015 WL 998249, at *9-10 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 5, 2015) (following EEOC guidance and requiring that employee with disability must be
offered light duty that was offered to individuals with on-the-job injuries); Leslie v. St. Vincent
New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 888 (S.D. Ind. 1996); cf Young v. United Parcel Serv., _ U.S.
-,
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). There, the Supreme Court found that an employee can establish a
violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by proving that an employer policy imposes
significant burdens on pregnant workers without sufficiently strong nondiscriminatory reasons,
leading to an inference of intentional discrimination. Id. at 1354-55. The "plaintiff can create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that
the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers." Id. at 1354.
371. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 227 F.3d 719, 729-31 (6th Cir. 2000);
England v. ENBI Ind., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1013-14 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
372. The court in Emrick concluded that an employer need not transfer a disabled employee to
another facility unless it has a practice of such transfers without inquiring whether such a transfer
would be reasonable or create undue hardship. 875 F. Supp. at 398. Other courts have accepted this
conclusion as well, citing Emrick. See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106
(S.D. Iowa 2002); Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 596, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
373. See Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing summary
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In summary, employees seeking reassignment as an accommodation
may be limited in many ways, including the lack of available positions
for which they are qualified and the existence of a seniority system.
Further, in some jurisdictions reassignment may be limited by the
court's conclusion that individuals deemed more qualified by the
employer can be hired in preference to reassigning the cancer survivor.
Finally, courts that do not require accommodations in the face of rigid
employer policies limiting transfers or light duty will also adversely
affect the ability of survivors to retain employment. While reassignment
may work for some cancer survivors, the limitations on this
accommodation restrict its utility.
D.

The FMLA, the ADA, and Cancer

This review of the ADA and FMLA demonstrates several limitations
that adversely affect cancer survivors. Both statutes are limited in
coverage, excluding many workers including those at smaller employers
and, for the FMLA, employees with shorter tenure with the employer.3 74
Additionally, the limited length and flexibility of available leaves and
the absence of required paid leaves do not meet the needs of many
cancer survivors. 375 The judicial tendency to accept the employer's
structural requirements, such as attendance and transfer rules, work
hours and work location, as essential functions of the job also restricts
the utility of the accommodation requirement.37 6 While some jobs
certainly mandate that the employee work particular hours or at a
particular location, courts have been reluctant to dig into such
requirements to determine their necessity. The limits on reassignment as
an accommodation, requiring the employee to be qualified and the
position to be vacant, as well as the position of some courts that a more
qualified individual can be lawfully hired, restrict the potential for
reassignment as an effective accommodation.3 77
Because the relationship between cancer survivors and work is
judgment in favor of an employer that had a policy of assigning only employees injured on the job
and employees with temporary off the job injuries to particular light duty positions, finding that was
insufficient to establish as a matter of law that assignment of employee with permanent off duty
injury would not be a reasonable accommodation).
374. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2012) (defining employer under the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)
(2012) (defining eligible employee under the FMLA); id. § 2611(4) (defining eligible employer
under the FMLA); supra notes 135-37, 148-49, 160 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 150-58, 233-88 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 301,330-38, 366-73 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 349-51, 358-65 and accompanying text.
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complex and variable, the solutions to the issues faced by cancer patients
must also be varied. The two primary statutes reviewed here focus on a
discrimination/accommodation model of dealing with individuals in the
workplace with health issues. As Professor Bagenstos has pointed out
with regard to individuals with disabilities in general, this model has its
limitations and cannot alone address the issues of disability and
employment.3 78 "Social welfare interventions" are also necessary.379 Yet
it is possible to make some broad recommendations for changes to fill
gaps left by the FMLA and ADA that would enable more survivors to
maintain or obtain employment. These changes must be part of a bigger
picture, however, which cannot be complete without further analysis of
other laws.
First, it may be helpful to review briefly the normative goals
discussed earlier. Maintaining employment benefits both survivors and
employers. For employees, it provides income and access to medical
treatment, along with psychosocial benefits. Keeping existing
employment, if possible, is preferable to termination and later
reemployment for two reasons. Hiring discrimination is difficult to prove
and gaps in employment must be explained. Additionally, changing
employment may require changing insurance, which can create
difficulties in obtaining necessary medical treatment. 380 For employers,
employee turnover is costly. 38t Thus, the goal of the changes
recommended below is to enable employees to retain employment where
they are able to continue working.
Nonetheless, if it were easier to obtain employment after leaving a
378. BAGENSTOS, supra note 219, at 136.
379. Id.
380. Continuing insurance through COBRA, where possible, is expensive and unaffordable for
many who lose employment. Other options such as insurance on the private market, even if
subsidized and thus affordable, could require changing treatment providers and interfere with
treatment protocols.
381. Of course, absenteeism is also costly, as is health insurance. In a given case, the cost of
retaining a particular employee with cancer could outweigh the replacement cost. The law already
makes some choices in this area, however, by prohibiting discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and requiring leaves of limited duration. See supra notes 135-37, 159-61. Expanded
protection could impose additional costs on employers. At the same time, costs of disability benefits
will be reduced. Depending on the source of the benefits, however, this reduction may not directly
affect the employer: Continued employment will also reduce costs for any other public benefits to
which the unemployed survivor might be entitled. Additionally the choice to link health insurance
and employment imposes this cost on employers, contrary to the decisions made by most other
developed countries, which provide health care largely through public financing. See Sharon M.
McManus & Khi V. Thai, Health Care Financing: A ComparativeAnalysis, 7 PUB. BUDGETING &
FIN. MGMT. 279, 286 (1995). Disability benefits and health insurance will be treated in future
articles.
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prior job due to cancer, maintaining employment would be somewhat
of
Professor
Bagenstos'
less
significant.
Implementation
recommendations to ease proof of hiring discrimination under the ADA
would be beneficial for cancer survivors.3 82 These recommendations
include the following: increasing available damages to encourage
attorneys to represent workers alleging hiring discrimination; increasing
EEOC enforcement activity focused on hiring cases; and using testersindividuals who apply for employment to test for discrimination, rather
than to actually obtain the job-to identify hiring discrimination.
While these changes would benefit all individuals with disabilities, a
focus on FMLA leave and ADA accommodations also holds potential
for improving employment for survivors.
Studies of the FMLA demonstrate that it has not created major
problems for most employers. While the limitations on coverage
recognized that absences create more difficulties for smaller employers,
the ADA already requires employers with fifteen or more employees to
accommodate absences and some state laws require smaller employers
to provide leave. 384The ADA standard is more flexible than the FMLA,
and thus less predictable for employers and employees. Also, courts
interpreting the ADA have been inconsistent at best in finding
intermittent leaves to be a reasonable accommodation. For employees
with treatment regimens of chemotherapy and radiation, intermittent
leave is a crucial accommodation. Decreasing the FMLA coverage limit
to twenty-five employees would guarantee more employees the
availability of predictable and intermittent leave.385 While decreasing the
coverage limit would impose some costs on smaller employers, it would
also have all of the benefits of increasing employment for individuals
with cancer and others with serious illnesses. Similarly, reducing the
qualifying period for leave to six months of employment and reducing
382. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 219, at 132-35.

383. Id.
384. The family and medical leave laws of the District of Columbia, Oregon, Washington, and
Vermont all cover smaller employers. See State Family andMedical Leave Laws, supra note 148.
385. The National Partnership for Women and Families indicates that this change would expand
coverage to 8.5 million more employees. NAT'L P'SHP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, UPDATING THE
2
(2013),
available
at
FAMILY
MEDICAL
LEAVE
ACT

http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/UpdatingtheFMLAFactSheet.pdf. The Abt
Associates study estimates that while 59.2% of employees are currently eligible for FMLA leave,
reducing the employee coverage number to thirty would increase that percentage to 63% while
reducing it to twenty would increase the percentage to 67%. ABT ASsOC., supra note 146, at ii. The
key employee exception allows employers to exempt certain highly paid salaried employees if
preserving the job would cause "substantial and grievous economic injury" to an employer, which
provides some protection for employers. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.217-219 (2014).
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the work hours requirement for coverage to include more part-time
workers would aid many cancer patients.386 While the one-year
qualification time period ensures commitment of the employee and
employer to one another before requiring leave, it substantially burdens
employees, like Sarah, who are diagnosed with cancer after a job
change. A six-month period requires some commitment, but protects
many more employees. And part-time workers may be as committed to
an employer as fulltime workers, particularly given the increasing
prevalence of part-time work. Additionally, women predominate in parttime employment,387 often because they are caregivers. Since many
women are cancer survivors, 388 expanded protections for part-time
workers would benefit female caregivers who often are in particularly
precarious financial positions.
Extending the amount of FMLA leave would also benefit survivors,
as many suffer the effects of cancer and its treatment for longer than
twelve weeks, calculated on either an intermittent or fulltime basis. The
ADA already requires extending FMLA leave where additional leave is
reasonable and does not cause undue hardship. 389 The unpredictability of
the ADA, however, could be alleviated by a requirement of additional
mandated leave under the FMLA with perhaps an exception that allowed
an employer to demonstrate unusual circumstances that made it
extremely difficult or impossible to cover the employee's responsibilities
for the term of the additional leave.39 °
Additionally, requiring some sort of paid leave would be of enormous
benefit, particularly to lower wage workers. While some employees, like
Sarah, have paid leave as a voluntary employee benefit, many do not.39'

386. Some states, including Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin, already have leave laws with shorter employment requirements,
reduced work hours requirements or both. State Family and Medical Leave Laws, supra note 148.
Abt Associates estimates that reducing the required work hours from the current 1250 to 780 would
increase the percentage of eligible employees from 59.2 to 63. ABT Assoc., supra note 146, at 2123.
387. See Labor Force Statisticsfrom the Current Population Survey: Table A-6. Employed and
Unemployed Full- and Part-Time Workers By Sex and Age, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB.
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea06.htm (last updated August 7, 2015).
388. See FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 10-11 (showing breast cancer as leading cause of
new cancers in women with eighty-nine percent survival rate over five years from diagnosis).
389. See supra notes 235, 265-75 and accompanying text.
390. This could be an expansion of the key employee provision, see supra note 385, available
only for the extended leave time.
391. Employees with lower educational attainment are less likely to have paid leave. See, e.g.,
HELENE JORGENSEN & EILEEN APPELBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, DOCUMENTING
THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE PROGRAM: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2012
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A study of employers covered by the Connecticut paid leave law showed
that the law had little-to-no business impact, despite predictions by
392
More than three-quarters of
business owners prior to passage.
employers surveyed supported the law a year and a half after passage,
with many reporting positive benefits such as improved morale, loyalty,
and motivation.3 93 The employers reported little abuse of the leave and
found that many employees did not take all of the leave provided.394
Further, the authors found that employment in the covered industries
increased while employment in the exempted manufacturing industry
actually decreased, belying claims that the mandated benefit would
reduce employment.3 95 This survey was more heavily weighted toward
the larger employers covered by the law.396
An earlier survey with a lower response rate found more negative
responses from employers. 397 Sixty-nine percent of employers in that
survey indicated the law was not good for their business. 398 Forty-seven
percent of the responding employers indicated that they had taken
actions such as raising prices, reducing wages and benefits, or cutting
employment to pay the costs of the requisite paid leave. 399 These mixed
results may be explained by the timing of the surveys or by differences
in employers sampled. It is possible that as employers had more
experience with the law, their objections and negative reactions
subsided.
FMLA SURVEY 4 (2014), available at http://www.cepr.net/publications/reports/documenting-theneed-for-a-national-paid-family-and-medical-leave-program-evidence-from-the-2012-fnla-survey.
These employees are also likely to have fewer financial resources that would enable them to take an
unpaid leave. Id.
392. EILEEN APPELBAUM ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, GOOD FOR BUSINESS?
CONNECTICUT'S PAID SICK LEAVE LAW 1, 11, 18 (2014), available at http://www.cepr.net/

documents/good-for-buisness-2014-02-2 1.pdf.
393. Id. at 15.
394. Id. at9, 16-17.
395. Id. at 4.
396. Id. at 3.
397. See generally MICHAEL SALTSMAN, EMP'T POLICIES INST., PAID SICK LEAVE IN
CONNECTICUT: A PILOT STUDY OF BUSINESSES RESPONSES TO THE LAW 5-6 (2013), available at

https://www.epionline.org/studies/paid-sick-leave-in-connecticut/.
398. Id. at 4. A survey of Seattle service employers covered by that city's mandated leave law
also found that more than half believed it would increase their cost of doing business one year after
the law's effective date. EMP'T POLICIES INST., PAID SICK LEAVE IN SEATTLE: EXAMINING THE
IMPACT ON THE SERVICE INDUSTRY 2 (2013) [hereinafter PAID SICK LEAVE IN SEATTLE], available

at https://www.epionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/130801_EPI PolicyBrief finall.pdf.
399. SALTSMAN, supra note 397, at 7. About twenty percent of Seattle employers surveyed
reported taking such actions in response to the law. PAID SICK LEAVE IN SEATTLE, supra note 398,
at 3.
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The Connecticut leave law, like the current local paid leave laws,
provides limited leave of only five days per year paid directly by the
employer.4 °° In addition, it covers only certain industries and employers
with more than fifty workers.4 0 Workers for covered employers begin to
accrue leave after 680 hours of employment, and part-time workers as
well as full-time workers are eligible for leave.40 2 This may not be a
perfect predictor for the impact of a broader paid leave law because of
the law's restricted applicability. Many of the covered employers already
provided paid leave to some employees, limiting the additional
impact.40 3 And while any paid leave will help cancer patients, most will
need far more than five days of leave for cancer treatment. Nevertheless,
the limited Connecticut study and the study of the FMLA provide some
evidence that employers adjust to additional leave requirements and such
requirements provide benefits to employers as well. Additionally,
evidence from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that paid sick
leave costs for private employers average only $0.26 per hour,404 and
significantly less in the lower paid service occupations.4 °5 While when
considered per employee per hour the costs add up, they are a fraction
of
40 6
the cost of total employee benefits, which averages $9.60 per hour.
Paid leave could be provided in a number of ways. The FMLA could
mandate pay for some or all of the available leave, or the ADA could
require paid leave as an accommodation. Both options would require
statutory amendment and impose direct costs on employers.40 7
Alternatively, a separate paid leave law could be enacted similar to those
in Connecticut and a few other states and municipalities. The law could
require the employer to pay the employee either all or some portion of
400. APPELBAUM ET AL., supranote 392, at 3.

401. Id. (describing coverage of only about 287,000 of Connecticut's 1.7 million employees
because of industry and size limitations).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 7 (stating that approximately 88.5% of employers had offered up to five days of sick
leave).
404. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Cost for Employee
Compensation-December 2014, at I (Mar. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Employer Cost], available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_03112015.pdf.
405. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Paid Sick Leave in the United States, 2 PROGRAM PERSP.,
Mar. 2010, at 3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_
vol2_issue2.pdf.
406. Employer Cost, supra note 404, at 1.
407. The Healthy Families Act, which has been introduced into Congress, would require paid
leave of up to seven days per year for employees who work for employers with fifteen or more
employees. See The Healthy Families Act, S. 631, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong. (2013). Seven days is
insufficient for most cancer survivors, although some paid leave is better than none.
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regular wages during time off.
An alternative method of providing paid leave is through mandatory
insurance similar to the unemployment compensation system.40 8 Federal
law currently allows withdrawal of employee contributions from a
state's unemployment insurance fund for temporary disability
payments.4° 9 California has such a system providing partial wage
replacement for up to fifty-two weeks when an employee is unable to
work as a result of a non-work-related illness or injury.410 The system
also provides payment for workers who suffer reduced hours or reduced
wages due to a job change necessitated by a disability.41 This disability
insurance aids employees in retaining employment and maintaining the
ability to pay for living expenses and treatment. The system would need
to be integrated with paid leave voluntarily provided by employers and
with the social security disability system, which provides benefits only
to those totally and permanently disabled for at least a year4121t could be
implemented at the federal level, by states, or a combination federal and
state system like the unemployment compensation system funded by a
tax on employers and/or employees. While a system funded by employer
taxes would impose costs on employers, as in the case of unemployment
compensation, there would be resulting economic benefits as these funds
will go into the economy in the form of housing costs, food costs,
408. Such a bill has been introduced in Congress as the FAMILY Act, which would provide
twelve weeks of partial wage replacement for most workers through a trust funded by employer and
employee contributions. Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, H.R. 1439, 114th Cong. (2015).
The law would reimburse employees on leave sixty-six percent of their wages up to a maximum of
$4000 per month. JORGENSEN & APPELBAUM, supra note 391, at 8 (describing the same bill from
an earlier Congress); see also ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at 1-4 (describing earlier bills and a
federal budget proposal with similar goals).
409. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 244, at 8-1.
410. For a description of the benefits of the system, see State DisabilityInsurance, STATE CAL.
EMP. DEv. DEPARTMENT, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2653 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Four other states, along with
Puerto Rico, have similar disability insurance provisions: Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and
Rhode Island. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 244, at 8-1.
411. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2656(a); Part-time Worker/Intermittent/ReducedWork Schedules,
http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/Part-time_
DEPARTMENT,
DEV.
EMP.
CAL.
STATE
IntermittentReducedWorkSchedule.htm (last visited June 28, 2013).
412. UMAR MOULTA-ALI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32279, PRIMER ON DISABILITY BENEFITS:
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS (SSDI) AND SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 3 (2013),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2152&context=
available at
keyworkplace. There is certainly overlap between paid sick leave and disability benefits, which
come in both public and private forms. There is no clear line between the two. Paid sick leave can
be used for illnesses and injuries that would not be considered disabilities, at least under most legal
definitions, as well as those that are clearly disabilities. Disability benefits for cancer survivors will
be further considered in a future article.
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medical costs, and other living expenses. California employers have
reported additional benefits as well, such as reductions in turnover and
reductions in the use of employer benefit programs. 413 Further, the costs
of mandatory insurance may potentially be paid in the form of reduced
wages for employees.414 Another advantage of the mandatory insurance
approach is that these systems typically cover smaller employers and
provide more leave, albeit at reduced income, than laws that require
employers to provide paid sick leave.
Providing paid leave for illness would align the United States with the
majority of developed countries, which already offer paid leave, either
through the employer, a social insurance program, or a combination of
the two. 41 5 While the amount of leave and the percentage of income
replaced varies, a study of twenty-two developed countries around the
world revealed that the United States is the only country that did not
guarantee some paid leave for an employee with a fifty day absence for
cancer treatment.416 Six of the countries studied actually provided more
protection to low wage workers than to the typical worker,417 which is
particularly significant because low wage workers in the United States
are often the least protected by the existing laws and employer
policies.41 8 The United States might look to the laws in these other
countries as models.
The other important change that would benefit cancer patients is in
the determination of employee qualifications and assessment of
accommodations. As a general rule, the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance
properly interprets the statute in light of its purposes. If the courts gave
more weight to that guidance, it would aid employees seeking
accommodations. 4 '9 For example, courts should not use the qualification
413. JORGENSEN & APPELBAUM, supra note 391, at 9.
414. See James Chelius, Book Review, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 199, 200 (1992) (reviewing
Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY (1990)) (discussing how employer-provided

insurance may result in a wage offset).
415. JODY HEYMANN ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, CONTAGION NATION: A
COMPARISON OF PAID SICK DAY POLICIES IN 22 COUNTRIES 5-7 (2009), available at

http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf.
416. Id. at 9-10.
417. Id. at 9.
418. Id. at 12-13; see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
419. The level of deference due to the EEOC's interpretations of the statute is not absolutely
clear. See Travis, supra note 330, at 68. Hoffman's analysis of the cancer cases prior to 2000
revealed that courts that failed to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the law or to the legislative
history of the statute were more likely to rule for defendants. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 410-11.
This insight remains true fourteen years later.
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standard to avoid dealing with the reasonableness of accommodations or
the question of undue hardship. 420 The statute clearly contemplates
changes in the workplace to accommodate disabilities, including
modification of work schedules. 421 The job functions are the tasks
required to do the job, not the method, time, or place of performing such
tasks. If the employee proves that he or she can do the tasks required
with or without accommodation, then the employer must prove that
changing shifts, work schedules, or similar modifications would cause
undue hardship.4 2 Inability to work the standard shift or schedule does
not automatically render the employee unqualified. Analyzing these
cases as the EEOC suggests, and as some courts have done, to focus on
whether the employee's request for an altered work schedule or extended
leave creates undue hardship will enable more cancer survivors to
remain employed. The same is true of policies that limit reassignment,
such as restrictions on light duty or transfers.
As scholars who have studied these cases in-depth recognize, courts
are more likely to mandate accommodations such as assistive technology
than those that require changes in workplace structures. But to
accommodate cancer survivors effectively, courts must recognize that
workplace structures and policies are not sacrosanct but merely
institutionalized practices that must yield to disability accommodations
under the ADA.42 3 Courts that uphold these structures as inviolable or as
essential functions of the job defer too quickly to the employer's existing
methods of operation. While the EEOC regulations properly recognize
that the employer's judgment is one factor in determining the essential
functions of the job, 42 4 it is only one factor and, as noted above
compliance with policies or job structures should not be considered job
functions.42 5 Instead, courts should determine whether noncompliance
420. Porter, supra note 189, at 16; Travis, supra note 330, at 58-72.
421. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2004); Travis, supra note 330, at 62 (citing 42

U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B) (2000)); ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238,
422. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supranote 238, 46.

22-23.

423. See generally ALBISTON, supra note 338, at 55-68.
424. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (2014).
425. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (defining essential functions); EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 2.3(a)(3)(b) (1992) ("In identifying an essential function to
determine if an individual with a disability is qualified, the employer should focus on the purpose of
the function and the result to be accomplished, rather than the manner in which the function
presently is performed. An individual with a disability may be qualified to perform the function if
an accommodation would enable this person to perform the job in a different way, and the
accommodation does not impose an undue hardship. Although it may be essential that a function be
performed, frequently it is not essential that it be performed in a particular way.").
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with policies or altered job structures create undue hardship.

Of course, there are accommodations that simply will not work. The
employer cannot accommodate an employee who drives a bus by
allowing her to arrive late, causing the bus to be off schedule. But such
cases will founder on the undue hardship prong. On the other hand,

perhaps a change to a bus that runs on a different schedule would allow
this hypothetical plaintiff to continue working.
Physical attendance should not be required where it is not truly
necessary and where some or all of the work can be done at home. 426

And given advances in technology, working from home is more possible
in many jobs, including those where interaction with fellow employees
or customers is necessary.427 Courts must not unquestioningly defer to
employer claims that jobs requiring supervision, teamwork, or
communication with employees or customers always require physical

presence in the workplace. With today's communication technology,
teamwork and supervision can easily occur remotely in many jobs.
In considering accommodations, courts must be willing to give

sufficient weight to the value of retaining an employee with a medical
condition that is temporarily disabling. For example, many
accommodations involving assistive technology or equipment may cause
a slight reduction in efficiency. Such reductions should be tolerated as a
cost of retaining an employee as retention can benefit both the employer
and the employee.
When contemplating reassignment as an accommodation, courts
should follow the majority of circuits, which, in accord with the EEOC
Guidance, require employers to reassign qualified employees with
disabilities despite the presence of more qualified applicants.428 Finally,
the EEOC and the courts should consider the possibility of requiring
426. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238,

34.

427. See Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 1:10-CV-00405, 2012 WL 832889, at *3, *15
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012) (denying summary judgment to employer that claimed that management job
requiring supervision of other employees, facilitating meetings, and coordinating with other
employees could not be performed at home because direction could be done by e-mail and meetings
were often conducted by teleconference).
428. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a
policy of hiring the best-qualified applicant does not establish undue hardship barring reassignment
and directing the district court to consider if ordinarily, mandatory reassignment is a reasonable
accommodation. If reasonable, the court must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine if there
is an undue hardship in the particular case that would make mandatory reassignment unreasonable);
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that a
reasonable accommodation may require reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position if the
employee is qualified and reassignment would not be an undue burden to the employer and noting
that requiring the employee to be the most qualified applicant is "unwarranted").
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some training by employers to render employees qualified for
reassignment.429 While such a conclusion might stretch the meaning of

"qualified individual with a disability," a relatively short retraining

period could be considered a reasonable accommodation under the
statute and might enable some cancer survivors to remain employed.
E.

The Limits of Legal Change

The recommended legal changes would not resolve all of the needs of
cancer survivors for employment support. Cancer survivors often cite
support from the employer and fellow employees as a determinant of
continued employment.430 Where such support comes in the form of
accommodations such as leave or more flexible work structures, legal
changes will help. Employer engagement in the interactive process to
determine appropriate and effective accommodations is also a legal
requirement that might be deemed support. But the emotional support
desired by cancer survivors cannot be legally mandated.43' Indeed a legal
mandate that imposes some cost on the employer and fellow employees
may have2 exactly the opposite effect, fostering resentment rather than
support.

43

Strong cultural norms support employer control of the workplace and
existing structures such as work schedules, work assignments, and work
locations.433 Changes to those norms, or even efforts to change those
429. Cf Craddock v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 533 F. App'x 333, 334, 337 (4th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (reversing dismissal of employee's complaint of age and disability discrimination based on
allegations that other employees were trained on a function and had she been trained she could have
been reassigned to that position). While the allegations in Craddock included a claim that the
employer had trained others, the suggestion here is that retraining be provided, even when not
provided to others, if it is not extensive or time consuming and would enable the employee to
remain employed. To date, courts have not required such training where it is not provided to others.
See, e.g., Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding no
obligation to provide special training not offered to nondisabled employees). While extensive
training should not be required, relatively brief training could benefit both the employer and
employee by enabling retention.
430. See supranotes 111, 113 and accompanying text.
431. Of course, if failure to support rises to the level of harassment by either supervisors or
employees, the employee may have a legal claim. See Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169,
175-76, 178-79 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing hostile environment harassment claim under the ADA
and finding in favor ofplaintiff harassed by supervisors); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Se. Pa.,
168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing elements of claim for disability-based harassment);
Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 589, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Walton, 168
F.3d at 666-67) (same).
432. Porter, supra note 189, at 79-81.
433. See generally ALBISTON, supra note 338 (discussing how laws such as the FMLA, which
require restructuring of institutional practices, may be thwarted by the existence of persistent
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norms, may evoke strong reactions that make the workplace less
welcoming to cancer survivors. These same institutional norms pose
limits on the effectiveness of legal changes.434 They may discourage
survivors from pursuing claims or even identifying discrimination.43 5
They encourage courts to limit the law by refusing to require changes in
existing workplace norms and structures.436 Thus, legal change is only
one part of the effort to increase employment opportunities for cancer
survivors. Cultural change, both in the workplace and in society, must
form part of the strategy. Leadership in institutions can facilitate cultural
change. Cancer does not respect 437 position or authority, and its ubiquity
may help foster change. Dialogue between medical, legal, and business
professionals can also facilitate change. This Article and those that will
follow seek to enhance that dialogue.
IV. SARAH'S FATE
The Article began with an introduction to Sarah, a hypothetical but
representative individual with cancer. Would the recommended changes
assist Sarah? The short answer is yes. Under current law Sarah is not
eligible for FMLA leave. At best she might get leave under the ADA.
The amount of leave she would be entitled to is uncertain. If the doctors
cannot give her a definite leave period, she may not be entitled to the
accommodation. Any leave she obtained beyond two weeks would be
unpaid. Further, unless her employer continues insurance for other
leaves, she would not be guaranteed retention of her insurance as if she
were working. As for her changes in shift, a court might find that
compliance with her assigned shift is an essential job function. She
might be able to obtain an accommodation of rest breaks or assistive
technology, but the rest breaks might be subject to the same argument as
the shift changes. If she were terminated for poor performance, she

cultural norms).
434. For an argument about how workplace norms limit legal change benefiting caregivers, see
Nicole Buonocore Porter, CaregiverConundrum Redux: The Entrenchment of StructuralNorms, 91
DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cffm?abstractid=2555872.
435. ALBISTON, supra note 338, at 235-36. This phenomenon may explain the limited numbers
of survivors that report discrimination despite the low employment numbers.
436. Id. at 123-33, 237-40; see also supra notes 330-38, 367-68 and accompanying text.
437. See Joann S. Lublin, Tuesday Morning Corp., Former CEO Settle Lawsuit over Firing,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
21
2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304049904579516012871293476 (describing settlement of claim that the CEO
of Tuesday Morning was fired because of her cancer diagnosis).
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would have to show a discriminatory motivation on the part of the
employer.
Under the recommended changes, her fate would be different in
several respects. The reduction of FMLA eligibility to six months of
employment would entitle Sarah to at least twelve weeks of unpaid leave
for her treatment (with two weeks paid based on her employer's policy).
If the FMLA were amended to provide for longer leaves subject to
employer proof that extending the leave would cause severe hardship,
she could get additional leave. With FMLA leave, her health insurance
would continue as if she were working. The ADA might also entitle her
to additional leave. If a paid leave were provided under either statute or
pursuant to a disability insurance program, Sarah would not only get
leave for her surgery and recovery but she would have some income
during that time. If indeed she has performance issues relating to her
cancer, either accommodations or leave might enable her to maintain
employment. Further, changing shifts to accommodate her treatment
schedule would be a required accommodation unless the employer could
establish undue hardship. As for any termination, she would still have to
show discriminatory motivation. If hiring cases were easier to prove,
however, she might have an easier time obtaining a new job after her
recovery.
These legal rights would ease, though certainly not eliminate, Sarah's
stress. Stress reduction could provide medical and psychosocial benefits
and might make her treatment easier and her subsequent return to work
more likely. 438 These benefits would attach regardless of Sarah's job,
type of cancer, or socio-demographic status. In fact, the lower her
income level, the less likely the employer would be able to show that her
return from leave was essential, as such employees can more easily be
replaced with temporary workers. Thus, these changes, with the
exception of telecommuting, may be of particular benefit to the lower
income and Latino and African-American workers who are more likely
to suffer unemployment as a result of cancer.
438. See Charissa Andreotti et al., Cancer, Coping, and Cognition: A Model for the Role of
Stress-Reactivity in Cancer-Related Cognitive Decline, 24 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 617 (2015)
(indicating that stress may contribute to cognitive changes in some cancer patients); Richard F.
Brown et al., Employee to Employer Communication Skills: Balancing Cancer Treatment and
Employment, 22 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 426, 432 (2014) (showing that educating cancer patients
about their legal rights and communication skills improved their confidence regarding
communicating with their employer about their needs related to their cancer treatment); Attitudes
and Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC'Y, http://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatmentsandsideeffects/
emotionalsideeffects/attitudes-and-cancer (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (indicating that it is not clear
that stress reduction, therapy, and emotional support impact survival but can improve quality of life
and help patients and families manage treatment).
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CONCLUSION
Analyzing the research on cancer and employment provides valuable
information about how to ensure that cancer survivors who are willing
and able to work during and after treatment can maintain employment.
Viewing the FMLA and ADA through this lens shows the strengths and
limitations of those laws. The recent amendments to the ADA have
benefited cancer survivors by making clear that they are individuals with
disabilities covered by the law. And the FMLA provides, for many
employees, leave that enables them to access treatment without loss of
employment. But the two laws have limitations that restrict their utility
for many cancer survivors. First, many employees are left out because of
the size of their employer or the duration of their employment. Reducing
these requirements would cover many more survivors with the
protections of leave and workplace accommodations. Second, paid leave
is completely at the discretion of the employer and more often available
to higher paid employees. A requirement of paid leave would aid
survivors in keeping their employment, particularly low income workers
who may otherwise leave employment to be eligible for public benefit
programs. Extended leave, through either the FMLA or ADA, would
also benefit many survivors.
Finally, more judicial deference to EEOC interpretations of the ADA,
which tend to be more favorable to employees and less deferential to
existing employer policies and work structures, would benefit cancer
survivors. An important aspect of this approach is to avoid treating
compliance with existing policies and structures as essential functions of
the job, but instead to analyze whether allowing deviation for the
individual with cancer will cause undue hardship for the employer.
Modification of the ADA and FMLA will not solve all of the
problems facing cancer survivors struggling to support themselves and
their families during and after cancer treatment. Some survivors are
unable to work for longer periods of time than might reasonably be
covered by even expanded paid leave. Further, health insurance issues
are intertwined with employment and merit further exploration,
particularly in light of the recently enacted Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Finally, a more supportive culture could both
encourage employees to remain in the workplace and make legal change
more likely. This Article only begins the dialogue about how to deal
with the growing population of cancer survivors in America.

